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INTRODUCTION

In 2019, Business Roundtable, an influential organization comprised of

executives from major American companies, announced that a corporation's
purpose is not only to pursue profit but also to advance the interests of a broad
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set of stakeholders.' Workers, suppliers, and the environment were among the
stakeholders named in the statement. 2 Although the statement has no legal

effect and does not call for legal or structural reform, it raised important
questions about the role of corporate activity in American life. Should
corporate activity further the interests of diverse stakeholder groups or simply
those of capital? Are company executives in a position to deliver value to all
stakeholders? Does corporate law determine this ability?
Business Roundtable is not the first to attempt to combine profitability
and socially beneficial corporate activities. 3 In April 2015, e-retail giant Etsy

held its Initial Public Offering (IPO), raising a total of $267 million.4 Etsyby then a household name-is known for creating thousands of jobs for stayat-home crafters and artisans (many of them women), enabling them to build
a business selling goods on Etsy's online marketplace. 5 Etsy is also notable
for its status as a certified B Corporation, or "B Corp." 6 B Lab, a nonprofit
organization, grants B Corp status to socially-minded for-profit companies
that demonstrate a commitment to creating social or environmental benefits.7
B Corp certification does not come with tax exemption or other government
benefits; rather, companies use the status to signal their commitment to a
social mission and to communicate that commitment to the public.8 Etsy was
only the second B Corp in history to file for a public offering.9 At the time of
the IPO, Etsy's professed mission was to "to reimagine commerce in ways
that build a more fulfilling and lasting world." 0 Etsy claimed it would achieve

1.
Top

David Gelles & David Yaffe-Bellany, Shareholder Value Is No Longer Everything,
C.EO.s Say, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug.
19,
2019),
https://nyti.ms/2NqGE7N

[https://penna.cc/GC4Z-YE7K].
2.

Id.
See Matt Egan, Etsy Now Worth Over $3 Billion. Stock Jumps 88% After IPO, CNN
(Apr. 16, 2015, 11:15 AM), https://money.cnn.com/2015/04/15/investing/etsy-ipo-16-a-sharewall-street/index.html [https://penna.cc/G6BM-F9RU].
4. Id.
5.
See David Gelles, Inside the Revolution at Etsy, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2017),
https://nyti.ms/2i4GjKE [https://penna.cc/VS9Y-MGGE].
6. Id.
7. About B Corps, CERTIFIED B CORP., https://bcorpomtion.net/about-b-corps
[https://perma.cc/5M59-MJM2].

3.

8.

See Jena McGregor, What Etsy, Patagonia and Warby Parker Have in Common,

WASH. POST (Apr. 20, 2015, 11:13 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/onleadership/wp/2015/04/20/what-etsy-patagonia-and-warby-parker-have-in-common/
[https://perma.cc/4K59-7GXL].
9. Id.
10. Gelles, supra note 5.
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this goal by focusing its decision-making on a range of stakeholders including
employees, neighbors, members, partners, and the environment."
Etsy's B Corp status did not survive long after the IPO. In 2017, citing

market and financial pressures, Etsy's board fired its Chief Executive Officer
(CEO), laid off staff, and dismantled its "Values-Aligned Business" team that
was charged with overseeing the company's environmental and social
impact.1 2 Etsy's management then decided not to continue as a B Corp,
allowing the company's status to lapse.1 3 Employees who were not laid off
were devastated.' 4 In fact, some cried in the office." Etsy's management made
these decisions in response to pressure from its public shareholders and board
of directors, many of whom felt that Etsy's social and environmental goals
were at odds with profitability.16
B Corp status is widely recognized and highly valued.' 7 Patagonia, Ben
& Jerry's, Warby Parker, and over 3,000 others have obtained B Corp status

to signal their commitment to doing business in a way that is socially or
environmentally sustainable.i This commitment is accomplished through
subjecting their company to a yearly audit by B Lab, increasing public
transparency, and altering corporate fiduciary duties.19 Companies pay up to

$50,000 annually for B Corp certification, 20 signaling to markets that these
businesses are serious about sustainability. These companies also use B Corp
status to codify their declared purpose of having a positive effect on corporate
or public benefit while profiting within their corporate charters. 21 This public
benefit is often defined as creating positive social or environmental outcomes
for one or more third-party stakeholders like workers, customers, or
communities. 22
The B Corp movement coincides with the burgeoning fields of social
enterprise and impact investing, all of which compel businesses to create

11. ETSY, PROGRESS REPORT 2014, at 3 (2015), http://extfiles.etsy.com/progressreport/ProgressReportPDF2014.pdf [https://penna.cc/78EX-A6GU].
12. Gelles, supra note 5.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. McGregor, supra note 8.
18. B Lab, A Year ofBusiness as a Forcefor Good: 2019 in Review, MEDIUM (Dec. 19,
2019), https://bthechange.com/a-year-of-business-as-a-force-for-good-2019-in-review-8e744ed
4d620 [https://penna.ccIL5TN-RFW2].
19.

See About B Corps, supra note 7.

20.
21.

McGregor, supra note 8.
See id.
22. Certification, CERTIFIED

B

CORP.,

https://bcorporation.net/certification

[https://penna.cc/7PRU-Y4TE].
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public benefit alongside pursuing profit. 23 Many businesses that consider
themselves social enterprises seek B Corp certification. 24 Like B Corps, social

enterprises seek to use commercial methods to solve societal problems
traditionally associated with the charitable sector. 25 When social enterprises
utilize third-party certification standards, such as B Corp status, alongside
new corporate forms, this explicitly allows for-profit enterprises to pursue
profit while creating public benefit. 26 Relatedly, impact investing refers to
transactions that have an express goal of furthering some public benefit. 27
Impact investing also heavily relies on the use of third-party standards or
metrics. 28

In social enterprise and impact investing, the intended beneficiaries can
either be a specific set of stakeholders or the public as a whole. 29 Both fields
respond to the perceived norm of profit maximization and its harms. 30 B
Corps, along with social enterprises and impact investing generally, comprise

the so-called Fourth Sector, which is said to exist for traditional charitable,
for-profit, and government sectors to pursue a mix of profit and mission. 3 1
That Etsy failed to sustain its course as a B Corp is perhaps unsurprising.

The B Corp Declaration of Independence makes clear that the goal of
corporate activity is to benefit a wide range of stakeholders beyond a
company's shareholders.3 2 Although those closest to social problems are best

23.

WILLIAM H. CLARK JR. ET AL., THE NEED AND RATIONALE FOR THE BENEFIT

CORPORATION 28-29 (2013), https://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/BenefitCorporation
_White_Paper.pdf [https://penna.cc/4SMV-BV4E]; see also Antony Page & Robert A. Katz, Is
Social Enterprisethe New CorporateSocialResponsibility?, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1351, 1368
(2011).
24. See Suntae Kim et al., Why CompaniesAre Becoming B Corporations,HARV. BUS.
REv.
(June
17,
2016),
https://hbr.org/2016/06/why-companies-are-becoming-bcorporations[https://perma.cc/4CQM-BTXZ]. Generally, social enterprise refers to any
enterprise that combines the pursuit of profit with the pursuit of social goals and includes many
other types of entities and corporate forms. Page & Katz, supra note 23, at 1353.
25. Page & Katz, supra note 23, at 1361.
26. Kim et al., supra note 24.
27. Deborah Burand, Contractingfor Impact: Imbedding Social and Environmental
Impact Goals into Loan Agreements, 13 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 775, 776 (2017).
28. DANA BRAKMAN REISER & STEVEN A. DEAN, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE LAW: TRUST,
PUBLIC BENEFIT AND CAPITAL MARKETS 127 (2017). Social enterprises use evaluative metrics

that "measure how much social good is achieved and compare social good generation over time
and across entities." Id. at 126.
29. See generally Burand, supra note 27, at 776; Page & Katz, supra note 23, at 1366.
30. See Page & Katz, supra note 23, at 1362.
31. Rae Andr6, Assessing the Accountability of the Benefit Corporation: Will This New
Gray Sector OrganizationEnhance CorporateSocial Responsibility?, 110 J. BUS. ETHICS 133,
134 (2012).
32. About B Corps, supra note 7.
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situated to fix them, B Corps are not required to empower their stakeholders
and intended beneficiaries to govern the company. 33 Despite its lofty goals at
the time of going public, Etsy did not employ any governance structures and

was not subject to any mechanisms to hold it accountable to its intended
beneficiaries. 34 The stakeholders for whose benefit Etsy professed to
operate-its employees, neighbors, members, and partners-had no say in
Etsy's decision-making process. 35 This lack of participation brings into

question whether B Corp status truly holds B Corps accountable to their
professed mission.
Public ownership is not necessarily a death knell for B Corp status.3 6 Two
other B Corps have held IPOs, and publicly traded Natura Cosm6ticos sought
B Corp status as a public company.3 7 These companies have not bowed to
pressure from public investors to abandon their B Corp status, if such pressure
even exists. 38 Still, Etsy is a cautionary tale of how businesses that profess to
pursue some social goal but lack the participation of intended beneficiaries
will, in fact, ignore the pursuit of this goal. B Lab certified Etsy without
requiring beneficiary participation, and Etsy's public shareholders forced the
company to abandon its commitment to the social and environmental purpose
enshrined in its B Corp certification. 39 Without the participation of its
nonshareholder stakeholders, the entities and individuals empowered to drive
corporate decision-making-boards of directors, shareholders, and corporate
officers-are free, and may even feel encouraged, to engage in behavior
contrary to social or environmental outcomes. 4 0
This Article is the first to look critically at B Corp certification through a
participatory lens. In analyzing B Corps and similar efforts, this Article
concludes that American companies trying to produce social or environmental
benefits through for-profit activity are not required to empower their intended

33. See Certification,supra note 22.
34. Gelles, supra note 5.
35. Etsy tried to market its shares to small investors and avoid large institutional investors
in order to cultivate a shareholder base that would be more aligned with its founder's social goals
and be insulated from a focus on short-term profit. Id
36. See Are Any B Corps Publicly Traded?, CERTIFIED B CoRp.,
https://bcorporation.net/faq-item/are-any-b-corps-publicly-traded
[https://perma.cc/Z3JAZ6WS].
37. Id.
38. See id.
39. See Gelles, supra note 5.
40.

Emily Winston, Benefit Corporationsand the Separation ofBenefit and Control, 39

CARDOZO L. REv. 1783, 1798 (2018). In this Article, I use the term "shareholder" to refer to
traditional shareholders; that is, someone given voting rights and a right to share in a company's
profit in exchange for an equity investment. A "nonshareholder stakeholder" then, refers to any
other party affected by corporate activity.
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beneficiaries in the decision-making process. Instead, decisions about the
definition, creation, and measurement of public benefit in B Corps are left to
traditional corporate governance mechanisms. This Article argues that
stakeholder participation is critical for these companies to realize their
intended social or environmental benefit.
This Article advocates for participatory measures to be used to create,
monitor, and evaluate B Corps. Specifically, this Article suggests a modelgrounded in New Governance theory-in which stakeholders and
beneficiaries are directly involved in B Corps' decision-making processes.
Companies should clearly define beneficiaries and, if necessary,
representatives of those beneficiaries. These beneficiaries or representatives
should be involved at every stage during the life of a B Corp (design,
implementation, and evaluation) to hold the corporation accountable. By
adhering to these principles, B Corps can engage in a participatory form of
corporate governance that has wide-ranging implications for contemporary

debates about the role of corporations in society.
Generally, how a public benefit is created and measured in B Corps and
the Fourth Sector is still very much in question. 4 ' As practiced in the United

States, these fields largely fail to include the participation of stakeholders and
intended beneficiaries in the pursuit of public benefit. 42 Elsewhere, scholars,
corporate law, and certifying organizations place

a premium on the

participation of intended beneficiaries in a project or program. 43
B Corp certification should emphasize beneficiary participation for two
reasons. First, the efficacy of projects and programs is harmed without the
input of intended beneficiaries. Second, in the case of B Corps, the
assumptions underlying corporate law that justify giving the power of the
franchise to shareholders also apply to nonshareholder stakeholders. This
Article articulates principles that should be used to design a certification
process that ensures beneficiaries are involved at every stage of the
governance of a B Corp-design, implementation, and evaluation.
A company's failure to integrate the participation of stakeholders, other
than officers and shareholders, into the design of a B Corp restricts the
efficacy of the company's intended social or environmental purpose. Rather
than excluding these stakeholders, the company should create conditions for
elite capture.44

The idea that beneficiary participation leads to more effective projects has
animated the design of anti-poverty programs in the United States since the

41. See Andrd, supra note 31, at 145.
42. Id. at 146.
43. Id.
44. See infra Section IIB.
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War on Poverty45 and is commonly applied to international development
projects. 46 A review of these programs shows that beneficiary participation

can be particularly successful when beneficiaries are closely involved in the
design and evaluation of programs that are accountable to these
beneficiaries. 47
Theories of corporate governance also lead to the conclusion that B Lab's
focus on nonshareholder stakeholders as beneficiaries of corporate activity
requires participation in the design and decision-making apparatus of the
company. 48 Generally, corporate governance theory views shareholders as
owners and beneficiaries of corporate activity 49 and, in exchange, vests the
right to elect members of the board in the shareholders alone. 50 As a result,
corporate directors and managers run the company as stewards for the
company's shareholders." Shareholders, however, are not the sole
beneficiaries of B Corps. Thus, within a B Corp, shareholders' exclusive right
to determine board membership ought to be curtailed such that intended
beneficiaries also have participatory rights.
In Part II, this Article introduces B Corp certification in the context of the
social enterprise and impact investing movements and concludes that B Corp
statutes largely ignores the participation of B Corp beneficiaries in lieu of a
stewardship approach whereby B Corp management and shareholders are
trusted to further the best interests of nonshareholder stakeholder groups. Part
II also explains that including stakeholders and beneficiaries in the decisions
of an enterprise is justified under predominant theories of social change and
corporate law. Finally, Part II examines global efforts to create standards and
metrics around social enterprise and impact investing and finds a lack of
emphasis on beneficiary participation in the American context. A similar
analysis of international standards, however, finds that some European social

45. See Wendy A. Bach, Mobilization and Poverty Law: Searchingfor Participatory
Democracy Amid the Ashes ofthe War on Poverty, 20 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 96, 100 (2012).
46. Jen Friis Lund & Moeko Saito-Jensen, Revisiting the Issue of Elite Capture of
ParticipatoryInitiatives, 46 WORLD DEV. 104, 104 (2013).
47. Bach, supra note 45, at 152-53.
48. See, e.g., Dana Brakman Reiser, Theorizing Formsfor Social Enterprise, 62 EMORY
L.J. 681, 719 (2013); see also Winston, supra note 40, at 1841.
49. David Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, 24 IND. L. REV. 223, 224 n.2 (1991)
("[S]hareholder primacy refers to [the] conception of management's responsibility and also to
corporate law's commitment to shareholder welfare as the primary objective of corporate
activity.").
50.

See P.M. Vasudev, The Stakeholder Principle, Corporate Governance, and Theory:

Evidence from the Fieldand the Path Onward, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 399, 401 (2012). This is
distinct from corporate law regimes in other countries that guarantee labor groups or other
corporate stakeholders a seat on the board. See id at 423.
51. CorporateDirector'sGuidebook, 33 BUS. LAW. 1591, 1601 (1978).
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enterprise models endorse stakeholder participation as a key factor of
enterprise design.

Part III of this Article first provides a framework-grounded in New
Governance theory and Democratic Experimentalism-for granting B Corp

beneficiaries decision-making authority. Then, Part III outlines three
principles to which such participation should adhere: (1) a B Corp's
beneficiaries should be clearly identified; (2) a B Corp's beneficiaries should
be granted participatory rights at all stages in the life of the corporation; and
(3) a B Corp should be accountable to its beneficiaries through ownership,
board membership, or some other means. For example, a B Corp can manifest
accountability to its beneficiaries by recognizing them as third-party
beneficiaries under contract or corporate charter, giving them with a right to
bring suit against the B Corp for failing to bring about a promised benefit. Part
III then concludes by proposing practical legal structures to achieve these
principles.

Finally, Part IV acknowledges and addresses potential criticisms of
beneficiary participation, including concerns that granting additional groups

decision-making authority can result in lost efficiencies and that marginalized
groups may have limited capacity to engage in meaningful participation

within a for-profit enterprise. A thoughtful certification process should
directly address concerns about efficiency, the capacity of beneficiaries to
engage in meaningful participation, and the risk that participation will become
pro forma. These challenges are not insurmountable but must be
acknowledged and addressed.
II.

B

LAB'S

CERTIFICATION

REQUIREMENTS

LACK

BENEFICIARY

PARTICIPATION

The Etsy story illustrates the incongruity between the stated goals of the
B Corp movement and theories of corporate governance in America. The

individuals and groups tasked with making decisions in B Corps are entirely
distinct from the stakeholders whose benefit the enterprises purport to
further.5 2 This approach flies in the face of assumptions that the efficacy of
projects and programs is harmed without the input of intended beneficiaries.53
B Corp design deviates from fundamental tenets of predominant theories of
social change and corporate law, both of which place beneficiaries of
organizational activity within the governance structure of the organization. 4

52. Winston, supra note 40, at 1788.
53. See infra Sections I.B, I.C.
54. Mohsen Manesh, Introducing the Totally UnnecessaryBenefit LLC, 97 N.C. L. REV.
603, 612-13 (2019).
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Whereas corporate law designates shareholders as corporate beneficiaries and
grants those shareholders the right to elect members of the board of
directors,55 social change theory gives program beneficiaries some say in the
governance of that program. 56

Anti-poverty and international development programs have long adopted
a theory of social change under which the participation of intended
beneficiaries is required for the ultimate efficacy of the program.57 However,
B Corp certification adopts the stewardship theory of governance, in which an
organization's management is believed to share interests with the
organization's principles and is, therefore, best positioned to act toward those
interests. 58 American corporate law largely adopts this stewardship approach;
however, in for-profit companies, owners elect directors that are granted other
governance powers. 59 Thus, while for-profit corporate directors are seen as
"steward[s] for the owners of the organization[]" 60 remaining accountable to
shareholder beneficiaries, beneficiaries in B Corps have no such right of
accountability.61
The stewardship theory also animates the law of charitable organizations,
which vests in directors and managers the duty and ability to further the
interests of the charity's beneficiaries. 62 While a charity's beneficiaries
generally play no role in charitable governance, government actors such as
state attorneys general and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) do enforce a
charity's commitment to public benefit. 63 There is no analogous public actor
to enforce a B Corp's commitment to its stated purpose. Both the lack of
beneficiary franchise and government oversight in B Corps demand an
increased role for beneficiaries.
A.

Introduction to B Corp Status

B Corp status is a prominent, highly sought-after certification granted
solely to companies that demonstrate an institutional commitment to pursuing
social or environmental business practices. 64 B Corp status was first

55. Millon, supra note 49, at 232-33.
56. Bach, supra note 45, at 112.
57. Id. at 97; Lund & Saito-Jensen, supra note 46, at 104.
58.

See CorporateDirector'sGuidebook, supra note 51, at 1601.

59.

Vasudev, supra note 50, at 401.

60.

CorporateDirector'sGuidebook, supra note 51.

61.
62.

Winston, supra note 40, at 1788.
Tracey M. Coule, Nonprofit Governance and Accountability: Broadening the

Theoretical Perspective, 44 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR

63.
64.

Q. 75, 77

(2015).

See Reiser, supra note 48, at 720-24.
McGregor, supra note 8.
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promulgated in 2006 by the Pennsylvania-based nonprofit organization B
Lab. 65 B Corp certification was created to assist companies and entrepreneurs

interested in pursuing mission alongside profit. 66 B Corp certification
measures a company's social or environmental performance by placing three
primary requirements on the company.67 First, the company must embed a
public purpose into its corporate charter. 68 Second, the company must report

its performance based on a number of factors. 69 Finally, the company must
subject itself to audits by B Lab in order to obtain a score reflecting how the
company's operations and business model impact its workers, community,
customers, and the environment. 70 Unlike organizations that are granted
501(c)(3) tax-exempt status by the IRS, B Corps do not receive tax exemption

or other government benefit.?
B Lab does not always place strict requirements on B Corps. Instead, B
Lab evaluates a company's efforts in certain areas. 72 Companies may take
divergent approaches to solve certain problems or satisfy some requirement. 73

For example, the certification process contains a governance metric that
analyzes whether a company has adopted a social or environmental mission
and if so, how it engages its employees, board members, and the community
to achieve that mission. 74 This metric also evaluates employee access to

information, customer opportunities to provide feedback, and the diversity of

65. How
Did
the
B
Corp Movement
Start?,
CERTIFIED
B
CORP.,
https://bcorporation.net/faq-item/how-did-b-corp-movement-start
[https://perma.cc/F9SFFZUD].
66. See Page & Katz, supra note 23, at 1368.
67. Certification,supra note 22.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. B Lab employs a B Impact Assessment tool that evaluates how a company's
business model and operations impact its workers, community, environment, and customers. Id
The B Impact Assessment tool gives companies a numerical score based on such factors as
governance, workers, community, environment, and customers, and tailors its analysis to a
company's

industry.

Frequently

Asked

Questions,

B

IMPACT

ASSESSMENT,

https://bimpactassessment.net/how-it-works/frequently-asked-questions/the-b-impact-score
[https://perma.cc/53VQ-ZJQU]. Among these other forms are the low-cost limited liability
company or L3 C, special purpose corporation, and benefit limited liability company. Kevin V.
Tu, Socially Conscious Corporationsand ShareholderProfit, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 121, 142

(2016).
71.
72.

See I.R.C. § 501.
The Standards, B IMPACT ASSESSMENT, https://bimpactassessment.net/how-it-

works/frequently-asked-questions/the-standards [https://perma.cc/9FFQ-LZXF].
73. See id.
74. Id.
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the company's governing bodies. 75 It does not, however, mandate specific
governance structures. 76 There is no requirement that workers, customers, or
any other stakeholder be given a formal role in the management of the
company.77 Even the presence of a unionized workforce-a mechanism that,
through collective bargaining, grants workers a say in company affairs-is

absent from the B Corp standards. 78
The B Corp certification process arose out of the social enterprise
movement, which seeks to use commercial methods to solve societal problems
traditionally associated with the charitable sector. 79 B Corps can, therefore, be
described as hybrids of for-profit and charitable organizations. 80 The benefit
corporation is a relatively new corporate form that allows companies to opt

into a legal regime that allows them to pursue a public benefit alongside profit
without running afoul of corporate law-specifically, without violating
directors' fiduciary duties to shareholders. 8' While B Corp status is distinct

75. Best for the World, B IMPACT ASSESSMENT, https://kb.bimpactassessment.net/
en/support/solutions/articles/43000519824-best-for-the-world [https://penna.cc/K9HS-9543].
76. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 70 (explaining that the Assessment
covers only "best practices").
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. To backers of social enterprise, neither the traditional for-profit businesses nor
charitable sectors were suited to tackling major social issues. See Page & Katz, supra note 23,
at 1362. On the one hand, the for-profit sector focused too heavily on maximizing short-term
profits at the expense of nonshareholder stakeholders. Id. In fact, many social enterprise backers
felt that for-profit corporations were bound to do so by fiduciary duties. Id at 1382 n.179. The
charitable sector, on the other hand, faced too many tax and regulations that limited the range of
activities that organizations could undertake to address social issues. Id. at 1362. Social
enterprise boosters believed that traditional corporate forms were not suited to the task of social
enterprise and that new corporate forms were required to accommodate purpose and profit. See
id. at 1354 ("'Social enterprise' is a loose term for businesses that aim to generate profits while
advancing social goals."); Patience A. Crowder, Impact Transaction: Lawyeringfor the Public
Good Through Collective Impact Agreements, 49 IND. L. REv. 621, 631 (2016) ("Social
enterprises are businesses that make profits both for the benefit of the owners' compensation as
well as the advancement of a specific social purpose or mission."); Alicia E. Plerhoples,
RepresentingSocial Enterprise,20 CLINICAL L. REv. 215, 225 (2013).
80. Page & Katz, supra note 23, 1368.
81. Benefit corporations use different mechanisms that allow a company to pursue a
public interest. Authorizing legislation provides that benefit corporations are to have the
purpose, enshrined in the company's charter that "creat[e] general public benefit." MODEL
BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 201(a) (BENEFIT CORP. 2017). These statutes also require directors to
consider the impact of corporate action on non-shareholder stakeholders and the public. Dana
Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations A Sustainable Form of Organization?, 46 WAKE
FOREST L. REv. 591, 598 (2011). Further, they grant immunity to directors who take the interests
of nonshareholder stakeholders into account when making decisions. Id. Benefit corporations
may also have a designated benefit director, who is tasked with preparing the benefit report
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from the benefit corporation form, there is overlap between the two. 82 Both
require changes to corporate charter, and B Corp status often requires
conversion to the benefit corporation form.83 Further, B Corp standards are a
common third-party standard against which benefit corporations are to judge
and report on their efforts. 8 4
In 2019, B Lab reported there were over 3,100 certified B Corps.85 In

addition to Etsy, household names Ben & Jerry's and Warby Parker are also
certified B Corps.8 6 B Corps signal to the customers and investors alike that a
company has met a standard of sustainability and is dedicated to some public
purpose.8 7 Customers interested in supporting environmentally friendly

businesses, for example, may choose to patronize a B Corp over a competitor
who is not comparably certified.88 Similarly, so-called impact investors
interested in investing in socially conscious companies may rely on the
certification when evaluating potential investments. 89

mentioned above and overseeing the creation of a public benefit generally. MODEL BENEFIT
CORP. LEGIS. § 301(c). Notably, scholars have suggested that corporate law does not in fact
prevent companies from engaging in environmentally and socially beneficial behavior and that
that benefit corporation is therefore unnecessary. See, e.g., Justin Blount & Kwabena OffeiDanso, The Benefit Corporation:A Questionable Solution to a Non-Existent Problem, 44 ST.

MARY'SL.J. 617, 647-48 (2013).
82. See Tu, supra note 70, at 143-53 (comparing benefit corporations and B Corps). B
Lab worked closely with the drafters of the Model Benefit Corporation Legislation. Mark J.
Loewenstein, Benefit CorporationLaw, 85 U. CIN. L. REV. 381, 383 (2017).
83. Traditional corporations, like Etsy at the time of its IPO, may be B Corps, but benefit
corporations need not seek B Corp certification. See Legal Requirements, CERTIFIED B CORP.,
https://bcorporation.net/certification/legal-requirements [https://perma.cc/WV9N-LKDE].
84. Other organizations, such as Social Enterprise Mark and Green America offer
certifications for qualifying social enterprises and may be used by benefit corporations in their
self-evaluation process. See SOC. ENTER. MARK CIC, https://www.socialenterprisemark.org.uk/
[https://perma.cc/M8S2-NZKQ];
Green
Business
Certification, GREEN
AM.,
https://www.greenamerica.org/subsite/green-business-certification
[https://perma.cc/TH327PZX]. There also exist standards that apply to specific industries. How Do I Pick a Third Party
Standard?, BENEFIT
CORP.,
https://benefitcorp.net/how-do-i-pick-third-party-standard
[https://perma.cc/66UH-8TG7]. The Federal Trade Commission, for example, has created
standards that apply to companies that make environmental claims. Guides for the Use of
Environmental Marketing Claims, 16 C.F.R. § 260 (2020).
85. B Lab, supra note 18.
86. McGregor, supra note 8.
87. Certification, supra note 22.
88. Kim et al., supra note 24.
89. The last decade or so has seen the rise of impact investing. ABHILASH MUDALIAR ET
AL., GLOB. IMPACT INVESTING NETWORK, 2017 ANNUAL IMPACT INVESTOR SURVEY (7th ed.

2017). According to the Global Impact Investing Network, impact investing refers to
"investments made into companies, organizations, and funds with the intention to generate social
and environmental impact alongside a financial return." Id. at 158. By the end of 2016, the GIIN
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Many founders also trust that B Corp standards require processes and
monitoring that will ensure a company is dedicated to its mission, particularly
as the company grows and strains are placed on its commitment to that
mission. 90 As a result, companies, customers, and investors rely on B Lab to
hold companies accountable for their social or environmental goals-in effect
outsourcing due diligence. 91
The ability to grant or withhold status permits B Lab to exert significant
influence over companies seeking certification, as well as over companies that
do not seek official certification but nonetheless use B Corp standards to judge
their efforts in creating some social or environmental benefit. 92 Therefore, B
Corp status merits assessment on its own and as a window into the American
approach by utilizing private, for-profit actors to create socially and
environmentally beneficial outcomes.
B.

Promoting Beneficiary Participation Enhances Efficacy

Failing to integrate the participation of intended beneficiaries into the

design of a B Corp limits the ultimate efficacy of that company's intended
social or environmental purpose. Scholars have argued elsewhere that
participation results in programs that are more responsive to beneficiaries'

needs. 93 As described above, B Corp design currently lacks beneficiary
participation and instead relies on metrics and decision-making procedures
that empower "stewards" to act on behalf of intended beneficiaries. 94 Without
the involvement of stakeholders, these efforts may realize the same outcomes

counted $114 million in impact investments worldwide. Id. at xiii. Major philanthropic
organizations have begun to look to impact investing as a strategy. Id. at 42. Private, for-profit
funds are also increasingly looking to impact investing as an investment strategy. Id at 2. In
2017, the Ford Foundation announced a $1 billion commitment to impact-driven investments.
Ford Foundation Commits $1 Billion from Endowment to Mission-Related Investments, FORD
FOUND. (Apr. 5, 2017), https://www.fordfoundation.org/the-latest/news/ford-foundationcommits-1-billion-from-endowment-to-mission-related-investments
[https://penna.cc/LP5G85EM]. Aqua-Spark, a for-profit Dutch fund that invests in sustainable aquaculture businesses
around the world, is an example of an impact investor. AQUA-SPARK, http://www.aqua-spark.nl/
[https://perma.cc/4Z8E-JEVP].
90. See Certification,supra note 22.
91. Winston, supra note 40, at 1803-05.
92. Sarah Dadush, Impact Investment Indicators: A Critical Assessment,
in
GOVERNANCE BY INDICATORS: GLOBAL POWER THROUGH QUANTIFICATION AND RANKINGS

394 (2012).
93. Bach, supra note 45, at 100.
94. See discussion supra Section II.A.
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as did similarly designed anti-poverty and economic development programs
in the past-namely, ineffective programs and elite capture. 95
The lessons of anti-poverty programs in the United States demonstrate
that participation of the programs' beneficiaries was critical to their success. 96
They also identify ways in which beneficiary participation can result in
effective programming. 97 For instance, the Economic Opportunity Act of

1964 called for "maximum feasible participation" by poor communities in
federally funded anti-poverty programs. 98 Through maximum feasible
participation, programs attempted to involve poor communities in the design
and evaluation of various programs intended to benefit those communities.99

Maximum feasible participation was a response to earlier New Deal-era
programs that were characterized by a top-down approach and, as a result,
designed in a patronizing and nonresponsive manner.1 00 Maximum feasible
participation was designed to enable community members to participate in the
betterment of their own communities.' 0 ' In putting poor people in positions to

set priorities and make decisions about the implementation of anti-poverty
policies, these programs hoped to benefit poor Americans and foster political
power among poor communities. 0 2 While maximum feasible participation
was considered necessary for public programs seeking to serve a particular
interest or community as a check against majoritarian policies, which
naturally disfavor minority groups, counter-majoritarian considerations are
less essential in programs that aim to serve the public at large.1 03
The idea of maximum feasible participation was and still is criticized for
creating overly burdensome program structures, for failing to revolutionize
poverty policy in the United States, and, ultimately, for failing to eliminate
poverty.1 04 However, maximum feasible participation succeeded in certain

95. Bach, supra note 45, at 100.
96. Id. at 128.
97. These lessons also illuminate where beneficiary participation can fall short. See id. at
128-31.
98. Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, § 202(a)(3), 78 Stat. 508,
516 (1964).
99. Tara J. Melish, Maximum FeasibleParticipationof the Poor:New Governance, New
Accountability, and a 21st Century War on the Sources ofPoverty, 13 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV.

L.J. 1, 3 (2010).
100. Id. at 31. Maximum feasible participation also represented an alternative to an antipoverty approach that saw poor people as market actors, opting instead to empower beneficiaries
of these programs through fostering the growth of political power. Id. at 3-4; see also Bach,
supra note 45, at 104.
101. Bach, supra note 45, at 100.
102. Id. at 105-06.
103. Id. at 103-04.
104. Id. at 122-29.
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places by creating programs that benefitted poor communities and fostered the
growth of political power in many instances.1 05 These successful programs
shared some key characteristics. In places where the program did succeed,
independent organizations were closely involved in the design and evaluation
of programs, participated in the governance of the project through
membership on the governing board, and held the programs accountable.1 06
On the other hand, the failure of anti-poverty programs such as low-income
housing projects has been blamed on a lack of participation by intended
program beneficiaries. 07
Debate over the involvement of poor communities and other beneficiaries
of public programs continues in the design and evaluation of anti-poverty
programs, and newer anti-poverty programs continue to utilize beneficiary
participation as a component of program design.1 08 To various degrees,

programs like HOPE VI and the Obama Administration's Social Innovation
Fund drew on the principles and lessons of maximum feasible participation.1 09
HOPE VI reflects the belief that resident participation is required to produce
housing developments that adequately address the needs of low-income
tenants." 0
Beneficiary participation is also viewed as a tool to prevent against elite

capture, particularly in the context of international development programs.1"
In elite capture, elites, rather than members of a beneficiary class, take
leadership positions within organizations and direct benefits of a program
toward themselves and not the program's intended beneficiaries."1

2

Elite

capture can rise to the level of corruption if funds and resources are
misappropriated, but it can also refer to the frustration of the program's

105. Id. at 103 (describing the implementation and success of maximum feasible
participation in Durham, NC).
106. Effective representatives "were similar to neighborhood residents in socially relevant
ways in this case race and class." Id. at 152.
107. Yap Kioe Sheng, Community Participation in Low-Income Housing Projects:

Problems and Prospects, 25 COMMUNITY DEV. J. 56,56 (1990).
108. Bach, supra note 45, at 115.
109. Id. at 112-13.
110. See Susan Bennett, "The Possibilityofa Beloved Place": Residents andPlacemaking
in PublicHousing Communities, 19 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 259, 302-04 (2000) (noting that
it was too early to determine whether participatory requirements would be effective and that
HUD data thus far showed a wide range in the amount and quality of community participation
in HOPE VI projects). See infra Part III for a discussion of the applicability of these
characteristics to B Corps.
111. Lund & Saito-Jensen, supra note 46, at 104.
112. Id. at 109.
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purpose." 3 Beneficiary participation can serve as a bulwark against elite

capture by inserting diverse stakeholders in leadership positions and
encouraging buy-in among the beneficiary class." 4 Consequently,
democratizing leadership and involvement results in programs that are
responsive to beneficiary needs and immunized against hijacking by selfinterested elites." 5

C. B Corp as a HybridModel
B Corps can be described as hybrids of for-profit and charitable
organizations," 6 and key assumptions underlying corporate and charity law
lead to the conclusion that beneficiaries should participate in B Corp
governance. Many theories of corporate and charity law provide positive

descriptions of what these entities are and, from there, make normative
arguments about how corporate governance should work." 7 B Lab has
provided a description of corporate purpose: to produce some social or
environmental benefit alongside profit." This Article employs widely
accepted normative accounts of corporate and charity law in support of
democratic beneficiary participation in B Corps.

B Corps designate nonshareholder stakeholders as explicit beneficiaries
of corporate activity alongside shareholders.11 9 On the contrary, corporate law
situates shareholders as the beneficiaries of corporate behavior and gives them
certain rights, namely the right to elect directors and bring derivative suits. 20

113. DIYA DUTTA, ELITE CAPTURE AND CORRUPTION: CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS 9-

10 (2009).
114. Lund & Saito-Jensen, supra note 46, at 110.
115. Even a participatory governance process that guards against elite capture could result
in self-dealing. Imagine a corrupt union boss using her members' power to direct corporate
resources to related parties. Even short of outright corruption, the more stakeholders are involved
in company governance, the more opportunities are created for conflicts of interest. Zohar
Goshen, The Efficiency of ControllingCorporateSelf-Dealing: Theory Meets Reality, 91 CALIF.
L. REv. 393, 396-430 (2003). In the case of B Corps, fiduciary duties and other mechanisms
intended to prevent conflicts of interest would constitute the primary preventative mechanisms
against beneficiary self-dealing.
116. See Page & Katz, supra note 23, at 1368.
117. See David Millon, Theories of the Corporation,1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 202-04. Millon
notes that the relationship is not entirely one-directional, and that corporate law and corporate
governance can also help craft theories of the corporation. Id. at 204-05. Because the primary
innovation of B Corps is a clear statement about what purpose B Corps should serve to produce
some social or environmental benefit alongside profit this Article begins from that articulation
of corporate purpose and prescribes a form of participatory governance rooted in that purpose.
118. About B Corps, supra note 7.
119. See supra Section II.A.
120. See supra Section II.A.
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As co-beneficiaries of B Corps, nonshareholder stakeholders should receive a
similar set of rights.121 Charity law, however, requires that organizations elect
a charitable purpose and insert the state as the representative of a beneficiary
group.1 22 The charity law approach acknowledges that some actor must speak
for the intended beneficiaries of B Corps; this Article suggests that
beneficiaries themselves are best situated to do so.
1.

CorporateLaw

Fundamental principles of corporate law support the argument that B

Lab's focus on nonshareholder stakeholders as beneficiaries of corporate
activity requires their participation in the design and governance apparatus of

the company. Several scholars draw on fundamental principles of corporate
law to argue that a focus on nonshareholder stakeholders as beneficiaries of
corporate activity requires participation in the design and decision-making

apparatus of the company.1 23 B Lab places nonshareholders alongside
shareholders as primary beneficiaries of the corporation's activities;1 24
nonshareholder beneficiaries should receive rights akin to those enjoyed by
shareholders.
Often, corporate law is described in agency law terms: shareholders, as
owners of the corporation, are the principals, and directors are the
shareholders' agents.1 25 This agency relationship is meant to preserve the
connection between ownership and control of the corporation. Shareholders
grant authority to the board through either monitoring the board's activities
by electing new directors or bringing derivative suits against directors and
officers in the name of the corporation.1 26 The directors are, in turn, bound by
fiduciary duties to exercise care when managing the corporation and to put

121. I continue to refer to non-investor parties, like employees, who are given voting rights
in corporate governance as "nonshareholder stakeholders" even though they may have
shareholder-like voting rights. These stakeholders are not granted rights in exchange for an
investment; they are granted rights in recognition of the effect that corporate activity has on
them.
122. See supra Section II.A.
123. See, e.g., Reiser, supra note 48, at 707; Winston, supra note 40, at 1832.
124. Winston, supra note 40, at 1832.
125. See, e.g., Millon, supra note 117, at 201 (describing a corporate law theory of
"corporate law as governing little more than the private relations between the shareholders of
the corporation and management, which acts as their agents or trustees").
126. Under federal law, shareholders can make proposals on corporate policy. 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-8 (2020). State corporate laws also grant to shareholders the right to vote on certain
major decisions, such as a sale or merger of the company. See Lisa M. Fairfax, Making the
Corporation Safe for Shareholder Democracy, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 53, 59-60 (2008).
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the interests of the corporation over their own personal interests.1 27 These

duties allow directors to check management behavior, overseeing CEOs
whose incentives may not be closely aligned with those of shareholders.1 28
These duties also help control agency costs that arise from multiple
constituents within the corporation attempting to monitor each other and from
the difficulty of coordinating large groups of shareholders.1 29
Each level of accountability within the corporation entails costs, and those
costs-along with the tendency of managers and other corporate constituents
to direct financial benefit to themselves rather than shareholders-constitute
agency costs. 30 Agency costs detract from the corporation's profits, and
shareholders are expected to monitor those costs.' 3 ' Shareholder monitoring
requires coordination, however, and so as a company's shareholders grow
more numerous and disparate, their monitoring will become more costly and
less effective.1 32 Duties to maximize shareholder value attempt to align
interests between shareholders and directors and minimize these agency
costs.' 33
The doctrine of shareholder primacy stems from this agency analysis.' 34
Under shareholder primacy-widely (though not universally) accepted by the
end of the last century as the animating principle behind corporate law-a
corporation's primary purpose is to further the interests of its shareholders.1 35

&

127. See, e.g., eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010).
128. This ignores a reality of modern corporations in which CEOs and other high-level
executives often are themselves major shareholders of the company. See Theo Francis
Vanessa Fuhrmans, Big Companies Pay CEOsfor Good Performance-andBad, WALL ST. J.
(May 17, 2019, 5:11 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/big-companies-pay-ceos-for-goodperformanceand-bad-11558085402?st=Oip55mskqq9uazy [https://perma.cc/7MY2-LBF7].
129. FrankH. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The CorporateContract, 89 COLUM. L.R.
1416, 1424 (1989).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1422-23.
132. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 309 (1976).
133. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law,
85 VA. L. REv. 247, 248-49 (1999).
134. Millon, supra note 49, at 227.
135. Id. at 223-24 n.2 (defining "shareholder primacy" as a "conception of management's
responsibility and also to corporate law's commitment to shareholder welfare as the primary
objective of corporate activity."). Other theories of American corporate law have been offered
that differ from or build upon shareholder primacy. Id. at 232-33. Among them are the theory
that the corporation is a "nexus of contracts" among various constituents and the theory that
corporate law should play some public purpose and regulate the relationship between the
corporation and society. Id. at 269-70. While these theories offer different rationales and carry
different implications for which constituents get corporate governance rights and what those
rights are, none challenge the right of shareholders to participate in the governance of a
corporation. Id. at 247.
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Those interests are often, though not always, defined as maximizing profits to
the shareholders.1 36 As a corollary, American corporate law vests the right to
elect members of the board of directors in the shareholders alone. 3 7 The
reasons for vesting such control in the shareholders are varied, and the amount
of additional power that the shareholders should have in governing the
corporate has been subject to much debate.1 38 American corporate law is clear
on one point, however: As primary beneficiaries of the corporation,
shareholders have the right to say who sits on the board of directors of the
corporation.1 39
Scholars give several reasons for the exclusive shareholder franchise.1 40
Under shareholder primacy, shareholders (as owners of the corporation)
exercise control over their property by electing members of the board who, in
turn, set the company's strategic priorities and make other large decisions.141
Emily Winston refers to this as the "separation of benefit and control"shareholders are the beneficiaries of the corporation, while corporate directors
make most decisions regarding the management of the corporation.1 42
Directors are stewards for the interests of shareholders and accountable to
those shareholders.1 43 In order to align the interests between these two groups,
directors must be held accountable to shareholders through the shareholders'
voting rights.1 44 Other stakeholders, such as customers or employees, have
rights created through contract, and creditors have certain rights in bankruptcy

136. David Millon, Radical ShareholderPrimacy, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 1013, 1018-19
(2014).
137. See Vasudev, supra note 50, at 424. This is distinct from corporate law regimes in
other some countries, which comparative regimes that guarantee labor or other corporate
stakeholders a seat on the board. Id. at 423.
138. See Grant Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, Shareholder Democracy and the Curious
Turn Toward BoardPrimacy, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2071, 2083 (2009).
139. Whether shareholders are able to actually exercise this right has been questioned. See,
e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 680
(2007); Hayden & Bodie, supra note 138, at 2074-75.
140. Bebchuk, supra note 139, at 711-12.
141. Hayden & Bodie, supra note 138, at 2083.
142. Winston, supra note 40, at 1788.
143. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directorsas Nexus of Contracts, 88 IOWA L.
REV. 1, 6 (2002).
144. Millon, supra note 49, at 223. This interpretation of corporate law is prominent, but
not universally accepted. Id. at 223-24. Some scholars view the corporation as the "nexus of
contracts" between and among various stakeholders, while others still advocate for a view that
corporations exist, or should exist, to benefit society as a whole. Winston, supra note 40, at
1806-07.
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and insolvency situations.1 45 Shareholders' unique position as corporate
owners establishes that only they have the right to elect corporate directors.1 46
B Corps challenge many positive descriptions of American corporate law
and therefore implicate a different governance approach than the sole
franchise granted to shareholders in traditional corporations. B Corps, benefit
corporations, and related forms employ a variety of mechanisms to enforce
the commitment to public benefit-benefit directors and managers charged
with specifically overseeing social purpose, public disclosure of social and
environmental initiatives, expanded fiduciary duties, the use of third-party
standards, and others.147 However, these mechanisms do not fundamentally
alter the relationships and incentives that underlie corporate law.
B Corps seek to change or expand the purposes of corporate law to
include furthering the interests of nonshareholder stakeholders, thereby
placing those stakeholders alongside shareholders as primary beneficiaries of
the company.1 48 However, B Corps do not vest in these stakeholders the right
to elect members of the board of directors or to otherwise participate in the
governance of the corporation.1 49 The lack of beneficiary franchise in B Corps
represents a break from the corporate law norm that directors must be
accountable to beneficiaries through enfranchisement in order to be effective
stewards of their interests.5 0
Much of the reasoning that justifies shareholder enfranchisement,
therefore, also applies to nonshareholder stakeholders in the case of B
Corps."' In these companies, directors are told to further the interests of
shareholders and third-party beneficiaries but are only accountable to
shareholders. 5 2 This leaves B Corp shareholders as both beneficiaries of
corporate behavior and as trustees for other stakeholders, holding equity and

145. Winston, supra note 40, at 1807.
146. It has also been suggested that shareholders, as the sole residual corporate claimants,
claimants, deserve participatory rights. Hayden & Bodie, supra note 140, at 2083. "Shareholders
benefit from maximization of the residual because they are not paid until all other claimants
receive their entitlements. This gives shareholders, and shareholders alone, the appropriate
incentives to exercise discretion in a way that maximizes value for the entire corporation." Id
While B Corps and benefit corporation legislation does not make nonshareholder stakeholders
residual claimants, they are promised other benefits and the incentives differ from those in a
traditional corporation. Winston, supra note 40, at 1786-87.
147. See Thomas Kelley, Law and Choice of Entity on the Social Enterprise Frontier, 84
TUL. L. REV. 337, 340 (2009).
148. See supra Section II.A.
149. See Winston, supra note 40, at 1834.
150. See id. at 1830.
151. See id. at 1820.
152. See id. at 1820-21.
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voting for the stated benefit of some third-party.' 53 The power to enforce a B
Corp's social mission is left to its shareholders through traditional corporate
mechanisms or affirmative lawsuits. 5 4
While some investors in B Corps are "impact investors" who explicitly
seek out companies that produce some public benefit, often with an
expectation of below-market-rate returns, 5 reliance on these investors to
actually enforce public benefit is problematic. It should not be assumed that
the interests of impact investors and other beneficiaries are aligned. Impact
investors may be placed in the awkward position of having to choose between
a course of action that benefits themselves and one that benefits other
stakeholders.1 56 At the time of this writing, no action by a shareholder against
a B Corp director or officer for violating the company's public purpose has
ever been filed."
Though granting B Corp beneficiaries participatory rights would make

corporate stewards accountable to them, it has the potential to create more
agency costs than traditional corporate structures. There is a robust scholarly
debate over whether shareholders, as beneficiaries of corporate activity,
should have greater control over the corporation.1 58 One school of thought,
led primarily by Professor Lucian Bebchuk, argues that shareholders should
be given more power within the corporation to make various decisions.1 59 This
enhanced power can tighten the link between ownership and control, thereby

153. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS.

§ 201(c)

(BENEFIT CORP. 2017).

154. See id. §§ 102, 305(c). Some states' benefit corporation statutes allow shareholders
and other designated entities to bring enforcement proceeding against directors if the company
fails to adhere to its stated purpose. Id.
155. Reiser, supra note 48, at 734.
156. Winston, supra note 40, at 1821. This will be the case whether investors agree on a
corporate goal or not. "If shareholders are uncoordinated and inactive, then neither share price
nor social mission will be defended. If shareholders are coordinated and active, we cannot be
certain how they will divide their efforts between promoting share price and promoting social
mission." Id. at 1824; see Sarah Dadush, Regulating Social Finance: Can Social Stock
Exchanges Meet the Challenge?, 37 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 139, 169 (2015).
157. Winston, supra note 40, at 1804.
158. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Casefor IncreasingShareholderPower, 118 HARV.
L. REV. 833, 912 (2005).
159. See id at 836. Another school of thought, associated with the work of Professor
Stephen Bainbridge, argues that most decisions are properly left in the hands of directors and
corporate management and that shareholder power should be limited to electing members of the
board of directors. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder
Disempowerment Response to Increasing ShareholderPower, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 173

(2006). The Bainbridge argument also seems to require that the power to elect directors, at the
very least, should rest with the intended beneficiaries of the directors' actions, and not with the
shareholders alone, in a B Corp. Under such a design, directors are still ultimately responsible
for corporate decision-making but at least owe their position to these stakeholders.
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reducing agency costs in the corporation and resulting in better outcomes for
the shareholders.1 60 Under the logic of Bebchuk, granting participatory power
to corporate beneficiaries will result in a corporate structure that is more
responsive to their needs, rather than one that leaves this responsibility in the
hands of directors and officers accountable only to shareholders.161
This Section treats the intended beneficiaries of a B Corp equal to its
shareholders and posits that these beneficiaries should receive rights that are
close to identical or on par with shareholder rights. One way to put these
groups on the same footing is to grant nonshareholder beneficiaries the right
to elect members of a B Corp's board of directors. Board representation is a
common tool to provide nonshareholders stakeholders, such as workers, a
voice in company governance.1 62 Another equalizing method is granting

beneficiary groups ownership in a company, thus erasing the divide between
shareholders and other beneficiary groups. For example, a pension fund may
be a major shareholder of a corporation and give workers and retirees the same
rights as other shareholders.1 63 However, board representation and equity
ownership are not the only means to grant nonshareholder stakeholders
participatory rights. Section III.B below explores the ways in which B Corps
can grant participatory rights to diverse beneficiaries.

2.

CharityLaw

B Corp design also merits a different approach than that taken by the
nonprofit charitable sector. Unlike corporations, nonprofit organizations are
not accountable to their beneficiaries;1 64 the state, rather than the
beneficiaries, plays the central role in ensuring these organizations comply
with their stated purpose. 165 The government defines acceptable charitable
purposes, how an organization may further its mission, and the consequences
for failing to do so.1 66

160. See Bebchuk, supra note 139, at 677-79.
161. See id. at 681-82.
162. See infra Section II.D (discussing European requirements around worker board
representation).
163. See Bebchuk, supra note 158, at 884-85.
164. See William H. Simon, Whom (Or What) Does the Organization's Lawyer
Represent?: An Anatomy ofIntraclientConflict, 91 CALIF. L. REv. 57, 112 (2003).
165. Id. at 112-13.
166. See David S. Walker, A Consideration of an LLC for a 501(C(3) Nonprofit
Organization, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 627, 631-32 (2012).
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As stewards of an organization's charitable mission, directors owe a duty
of obedience to the organization to carry out its mission.16 7 State attorneys
general and the IRS largely oversee the regulation of charitable
organizations.1 68 Breaches of duty, failure to diligently pursue a charitable
mission, and deviations from the nonprofit organization's lawful mission are
all subject to enforcement actions by both the IRS and state attorneys
general.1 69
Unlike for-profit corporations, nonprofit charities have no owners;
"nonprofit" refers to an organization lacking shareholders to whom it can
distribute profit. 7 0 The public, or a narrower beneficiary class if the charity
so elects, is the primary beneficiary of charitable activity rather than
shareholders.' 7' A charity's directors and officers are still its stewards, but an
organization's principals cannot elect or sue them. Given that charities lack
owners to act as principals, charity law has long required the government to
step in to represent beneficiaries.1 72

The doctrine of parens patrie, or "parent of the nation," dates back to
seventeenth century England and requires the state (originally, the crown) to
protect the young, the ill, and others commonly aided by charities.1'3 This
doctrine-first used to justify the state's role in matters of guardianship over
minors and those lacking capacity-expanded to require the state to play a
substantial role in holding charities to their public purposes.

7 4

Charities exist

to serve the public at large, and, to the extent that charities have direct
beneficiaries, those beneficiaries are poor, infirm, and otherwise unable to
monitor charitable activity.1'5 Who better to stand in for them than the
government? 7 6 This lack of ownership leaves a void in the principal-agent
relationship that the government must fill.

The government also grants substantial benefits to charities-most
notably, exemption from income taxes.17 7 This is a major benefit for charities

167. Walker, supra note 166, at 627, 660 (2012). But see RESTATEMENT OF THE L. OF
§ 3.01 (AM. L. INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2016) (allowing
directors to amend governing documents and mission statement from time to time).
168. Terri Lynn Helge, Policing the Good Guys: Regulation of the Charitable Sector
Through a FederalCharity Oversight Board, 19 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 8 (2009).
169. See id. at 13, 17-18.
170. See Walker, supra note 166, at 662.
171. Id. at 669-70.
172. Helge, supra note 168, at 15.
173. See George Rossman, ParensPatriae,4 OR. L. REv. 233, 237 (1925).
CHARITABLE NONPROFIT ORGS.

174. See Margaret S. Thomas, ParensPatriae and The States' HistoricPolice Power, 69

SMU L. REv. 759, 771 (2016).
175. See Helge, supra note 168, at 16.
176. See id.
177. I.R.C. § 501 (2018).
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'

but comes with significant strings attached. Tax exemption can be seen as a
subsidy paid to charitable organizations from the tax-paying public.17 8 The
government must step in to ensure that charities further some charitable
purpose, for example by scrutinizing charities' finances to prevent them from
competing unfairly with for-profit companies or otherwise misusing their
subsidy. 7 9 For-profit entities strike no such bargain with government. 80
The state-centric model of charity law is ill-suited to B Corps. For one,
neither the federal government nor any state grants tax exemption to B Corps,
benefit corporations, or any other for-profit corporate form or certification.' 8
State governments have comparatively little interest in closely regulating
companies without such benefit. This lack of regulation gives B Corps
flexibility in defining their purpose, identifying their beneficiaries, and
choosing their business methods. Consequently, B Corp beneficiaries are left
without significant representation by either the company's shareholders or the
government. As stated in Section II.B above, beneficiaries themselves are
well-positioned to ensure that a B Corp is meeting its social purposewhatever this purpose may be-and should step in to fill this void.18 2
Minimizing regulatory oversight of mission-driven social enterprises

makes sense given the animating goals of the B Corp movement. B Lab and
others believe the charitable sector faces too many regulations that limit what
organizations can do to address social issues.1 83 To these advocates,
commercial methods do not prevent the furtherance of social or environmental
purposes.1 84 Rather, commercial methods can and should be used to solve
societal problems traditionally addressed by the charitable sector.1 85 Doing so
prevents relying on the state to act as stewards of the public interests and
instead empowers the intended beneficiaries of corporate action.186

178. See Helge, supra note 168, at 32.
179. See Walker, supra note 166, at 658.
180. State corporate codes in fact permit corporations to be chartered in furtherance of any
lawful activity. Elizabeth Pollman, CorporateDisobedience, 68 DUKE L.J. 709, 711 (2019).
181. See I.R.C. § 501. Several states and localities offer procurement preference forbenefit
corporations and related companies; however, this benefit is small compared to tax-exemption
for charitable organizations. Michelle Baker, Socially Responsible Businesses Get a Boostfrom
Local
Governments,
NONPROFIT
L.
BLOG
(May
8,
2013),
http://www.nonprofitlawblog.com/socially-responsible-businesses-get-a-boost-from-localgovernments/ [https://perna.cc/R6U5-HJNU].
182. See supra Section II.B.
183. See Page & Katz, supra note 23, at 1361-62.
184. See id. at 1362.
185. Id. at 1368.
186. See infra Section III.B for a discussion of the role of soft law mechanisms like B Corp
certification in fourth sector regulation.
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The European Approach to the Fourth Sector Focuses More on
Beneficiary Participationthan the American Approach

As explained above, B Corp design largely adopts the stewardship
approach of corporate and charity law without either preserving the
connection between corporate beneficiaries and control of the corporation or
tasking the state with overseeing the creation of some social or environmental
benefit. It tasks corporate directors-and shareholders to a lesser extent-with
furthering the interests of a B Corp's intended beneficiaries without granting
those beneficiaries participation in governing the company. This structure

stands in sharp contrast to the social enterprise approach used by other
countries, particularly in continental Europe.18 7 Many European social
enterprise models deliberately place intended beneficiaries of a company in
the decision-making structure of the enterprise.1 88 Rather than endorsing the
top-down approach adopted by B Lab, European social enterprise structures

and standards reflect the desire to empower nonshareholder stakeholders
through enterprise design.189
1.

American Structures Lack BeneficiaryParticipation

As the most well-known American organization certifying social
enterprises, B Lab sets highly influential standards in the field.1 90 While B Lab
is not the only American organization to promote using commercial methods
for social or environmental purposes, most American organizations adopt a
similar approach to the one B Lab uses.191 American Fourth Sector standardssetting bodies (such as B Lab) and corporate structures (such as the benefit
corporation) empower shareholders, directors, and officers to make decisions
for the company as they would in any for-profit corporation.1 92
Investor preferences, corporate culture, and public statements about
sustainability perhaps constrain such decisions, but there is generally little

187. See Katharine V. Jackson, Towards a Stakeholder-ShareholderTheory of Corporate
Governance: A Comparative Analysis, 7 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 309, 312 (2011) (analyzing

stakeholder investors for corporations in America, Germany, and the United Kingdom).
188. See infra Section II.D.2.
189. Id. at 310-12.
190. Mara Leighton, B Corps Are Businesses Committed to Using Their Profit for

Good- These 14 Are Making Some Truly Great Products, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 23, 2020, 3:04
PM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/b-corp-retail-companies
[https://perma.cc/U3S8ERML].
191. See Page & Katz, supra note 23, at 1368.
192. See Jackson, supra note 187, at 312.
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accountability to or control by the beneficiaries themselves.1 93 B Lab places
these ongoing requirements on B Corps.1 94 Moreover, B Lab uses soft law

rather than hard law measures to enforce these requirements.1 95 Companies
seeking a certification like B Corp status are audited by the relevant
certification body (B Lab in the case of B Corps), and B Corps that fail to
consider third-party stakeholders' interests may lose B Corp status.1 96 B Corps
do not make this information public, however, which weakens what
enforcement power B Lab has. B Corps can also abandon the certification
without sanction.1 97 Etsy's decision to let its B Corp status lapse, for example,
shows that companies may feel this certification is of questionable value such
that compliance with its requirements is not worthwhile.
In the field of impact investment, organizations around the globe have
created (or are in the process of creating) standards or metrics by which
transacting parties can measure their efforts to create impact.1 98 These efforts

193. See Fairfax, supra note 126, at 96-97; Winston, supra note 40, at 1788.
194. Certification Requirements, CERTIFIED B CORP., https://bcorporation.net/
certification/meet-the-requirements [https://perma.cc/G2MU-89EL]
195. See id.
196. Id.
197. See id.
198. Burand, supra note 28, at 779. These indicators are often referred to as environment,
social, and governmental or "ESG" metrics. J. Haskell Murray, Social EnterpriseandInvestment
Professionals: SacrificingFinancialInterests?, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 765, 773 (2017). Some
commonly used indicators include the Principles for Responsible Investment, About the PRI,
PRINCIPLES
FOR
RESPONSIBLE
INV.,
https://www.unpri.org/pri/about-the-pri
[https://perma.cc/ZV4D-XQ2L], Impact Reporting and Investment Standards promulgated by
the GIN, IRIS Catalog of Metrics, IRIS+ SYS. I STANDARDS, https://iris.thegiin.org/metrics/
[https://perma.cc/U7W8-9XKF], and those promulgated by the Sustainable Accounting
Standards Board ("SASB"). Standards Board, SUSTAINABILITY ACCT. STANDARDS BD.,
https://www.sasb.org/governance/standards-board/
[https://perma.cc/98MN-6TMB].
These
measures attempt to define concrete standards by which impact investors and recipients of
impact investments can judge their efforts at creating social impact. Similar to social enterprise
metrics discussed in Section IID, many of these metrics are sector-specific and focus on an
organization's governance, reporting, and utilization of various strategies and policies. The IRIS
metrics look at a company's use of strategies to reduce the use of energy, water, and greenhouse
gases, for example. IRIS CatalogofMetrics, supra. A major value-added of these forms relates
to branding: entities incorporated as L3 Cs or Benefit Corporations communicate unambiguously
to investors, clients, and consumers that they are mission-driven and that they weigh social and
environmental returns heavily. Kevin Davis et al., Introduction: Global Governance by
Indicators, in GOVERNANCE BY INDICATORS: GLOBAL POWER THROUGH QUANTIFICATION
AND RANKINGS, supra note 92, at 27; Dadush, supra note 92, at 433 ("GIIRS and IRIS both
structure and influence decision-making by investors and investees. In so doing, they build a
market for impact investing, making possible its graduation from idea to industry to asset class.
GIIRS and IRIS also play an important role as interventions that can influence, stimulate, and
even incubate regulation by governmental actors, thus contributing to the official policy
landscape into which impact investing could be inserted.").
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largely rely on the parties to a transaction to set the terms upon which its
intended impact will be created and measured.1 99 Parties may tie payment
terms to the satisfaction of certain quantifiable outcomes, and they may
enforce other covenants when certain events occur that relate to public benefit.
But these devices expand on traditional lending concepts and largely treat the
question of impact as a contractual one between the parties, rather than a
collaborative endeavor involving intended beneficiaries.200
Though varied, these metrics have much in common. They are primarily
industry-specific, such that companies operating in certain industries have
unique mandates and considerations. 20 ' Although many focus on diversity
within a company's workforce and decision-making bodies, most extoll the
virtue of stakeholder engagement-the process by which stakeholders are
informed, and even consulted, on corporate decisions. 20 2 American impact
investing standards do not require that stakeholders or intended beneficiaries
actually participate in the company's or transacting parties' decision-making

processes,
bargaining.

however. 20 3

Likewise,

few

emphasize

collective

worker

20 4

Table 1 is a summary of American Fourth Sector standards, starting with
B Corp requirements and including other standards for social enterprise and
impact investing. 205 This summary focuses on each set of standards' overall

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Dadush, supra note 92, at 425.
See, e.g., Burand, supra note 27, at 778-82.
See Dadush, supra note 92, at 394.
See id. at 408.
See Shareholder, supra note 158, at 844-47.

204. B Lab Controversial Issues Statement

Unionization Efforts by Employees, B LAB

(Apr. 2018), https://blab-mktg-bcorporation-production.s3.amazonaws.com/Union%2 0 Contro
versialo20Issues.pdf [https://perna.cc/RZ69-PTLQ]. B Lab has voiced tepid support for
collective bargaining, stating in 2018:
Companies who have taken a public stance against unionization, or have engaged in
activities that can be perceived as taking a stance against union organizing activities,
are required, at minimum, to make their stance and practices transparent on their B
Corp public profile. Specific practices that impede the rights of workers to organize,
such as the violation of laws designed to protect the right of employees to organize,
or the hiring of outside consultants specializing in responses to union organizing
activity, will also be reviewed by the Standards Advisory Council to determine if
additional actions, including remediation or ineligibility for the Certification, should
be taken.
Id.
205. Fourth Sector metrics are foundational or evaluative. Foundational metrics are
standard data inputs that standards-setting organizations use to compare entities. Evaluative
metrics seek to measure how much social good is created. See REISER & DEAN, supra note 28,
at 126. Because this Article focuses on beneficiary participation and collective bargaining in all
Fourth Sector metrics, the tables in this Section are not divided between foundational and
evaluative metrics.
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mission and metrics as they relate to governance, beneficiary participation,

and beneficiary engagement, to the extent they exist. The summary also
highlights the extent to which these standards focus on employee ownership,
collective bargaining, or both. This metric is included because employees are
frequently designated as beneficiaries of corporate activity, and employee
ownership and collective bargaining have historically been used as tools to
encourage employee participation in corporate

decision-making.

Many

companies whose purpose is to benefit some set of nonshareholder
stakeholders identify employees as beneficiaries. 206 This is especially true for
companies organized as worker cooperatives, employee stock ownership

plans, or other corporate forms that explicitly grant employees ownership
rights in the company. 207 Similarly, collective bargaining grants employees
the right to participate in company decisions, particularly those that affect
employees, through negotiated contracts between company management and
labor unions.208

206. See Norman D. Bishara, Hybrid Entities and the Psychological Contract with
Employee-Stakeholders, 22 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 303, 312, 341 (2020). Fourth sector certifications
and forms like B Corp status and the benefit corporation are touted as being particularly
promising for companies who are organized to benefit employees as a class. Id.
207. Id. at 341.
208. Id.
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Table 1. Summary of American Fourth Sector Standards
B Lab
Year Founded

2006209

Location

Pennsylvania, U.S.

Mission

B Corp is a certification promulgated and administered by the
nonprofit B Lab. B Corp certification measures a company's
entire social and environmental performance. This is carried out
through B Impact Assessment, which evaluates how the
operations and business model impact the workers, community,
environment, and customers.211

Key Corporate Governance
Metrics

The B Impact Assessment's governance section evaluates a
company's mission: whether it has adopted a social or
environmental mission; how it engages its employees, board
members, and the community to achieve that mission; and the
212
diversity of the company's governing bodies.

210

Beneficiary Participation and The B Impact Assessment does not include beneficiary
Engagement
participation. A company's stakeholder engagement strategy
213
may result in a higher B Impact Assessment score.
Employee Ownership and
Collective Bargaining

209. Our

History,

The B Impact Assessment's area scores for workers measure
compensation and wages; benefits; training and education;
worker ownership, management, and communication; job
flexibility; and corporate culture.214

CERTIFIED

B

CORP.,

https://webarchive.loc.gov/all/

20151014 104554/https://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps/the-non-profit-behind-b-corp

s/our-history.
210. Contact
Us,
CERTIFIED
B
CORP.,
https://bcorporation.net/contact-us
[https://perma.cc/Z3FC-S54N].
211. About B Corps, CERTIFIED B CORP., supra note 7.
212. Certification,CERTIFIED B CORP., supra note 22.
213. Ruben Burga, Stakeholder Engagement, B Corp Certification and Benefit
Corporations, BOREALIS (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.boreal-is.com/blog/stakeholderengagement-b-corp-certification/ [https://penna.cc/VGZ3-EU33].
214. Completing
the
B
Impact
Assessment,
CULTIVATING
CAP.,
https://www.cultivatingcapital.com/completing-the-b-impact-assessment/
[https://perma.cc/7TGV-B72T]. Worker ownership does appear to be favored in B Lab's Impact
Assessment process King Arthur Flour received an extra thirty points in its worker
measurement for being worker owned.
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Table 1. Summary of American Fourth Sector Standards
Global Impact Investment Rating System (GIIRS)
2011215

Location

New York, U.S.2 1

Mission

GIIRS is a comprehensive, comparable, and transparent system
for assessing the social and environmental impact of companies
and funds. It has a ratings and analytics approach analogous to
Morningstar investment rankings. Additionally, GIIRS provides
investors and investment advisors with access to aggregated
ratings information through a product called GIIRS Analytics. 27

Key Corporate Governance
Metrics

Governance themes include corporate accountability and
transparency. These include mission and engagement,
governance, transparency and reporting, and anti-corruption. 28

'

Year Founded

Beneficiary Participation and GIIRS is silent on beneficiary participation and engagement.
Engagement
Employee Ownership and
Collective Bargaining

Worker-related themes include compensation, benefits, and
training; employee ownership, work environment, and human
rights and labor policies; compensation, training and benefits;
219
worker ownership; and work environment.

215. Launch
of
GIIRS
Ratings
&
Analytics,
CLINTON
FOUND.,
https://www.clintonfoundation.org/clinton-global-initiative/commitments/launch-giirs-ratingsanalytics [https://penna.cc/D3ZG-TCK2].
216. Global

Impact

Investing

Network,

Inc.,

CHARITY

NAVIGATOR,

https://www.charitynavigator.org/ein/273166994 [https://penna.cc/2L9V-TQ7K].
217. Beth Richardson, Sparking Impact Investing Through GIIRS, STANFORD SOC.
INNOVATION
REV.
(Oct.
24,
2012),
https://ssir.org/articles/entry/sparking_
impactinvestingthrough giirs [https://perma.cc/LBE6-XSUM].
218. See, e.g., Company Report: Education Tools R Us, B ANALYTICS (2014), https://banalytics.net/sites/default/files/documents/Education_Tools_R_UsCompany Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R5AV-MJGS].
219. See, e.g., id
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Table 1. Summary of American Fourth Sector Standards
Impact Reporting and Investment Standards (IRIS)
Year Founded

2008220

Location

New York, U.S

Mission

IRIS is the catalog of generally accepted performance metrics
that leading impact investors use to measure social,
environmental, and financial success; evaluate deals; and
augment the sector's credibility. IRIS is an initiative of the
Global Impact Investing Network (GIIN), a nonprofit
organization based in New York that is dedicated to increasing
the scale and effectiveness of impact investing.

22

The IRIS catalog does not judge whether performance is good or
bad. Using IRIS metrics does not result in a certification or
performance rating. Instead, IRIS metrics can be incorporated
into different performance systems, such as assessment tools,
222
proprietary scorecards, and methodologies.
Key Corporate Governance The IRIS governance and ownership metrics focus on board
Metrics
membership and the extent to which corporate governance
23
policies are communicated with stakeholders, among others.
Beneficiary Participation
and Engagement

The Community Engagement Strategy indicates whether the
organization implements a strategy to manage its interactions
with local communities affected by its operations. The strategy
may dictate methods (e.g., memorandum of understanding) for
considering, informing, and consulting with existing community
groups before implementing organizational activities that affect
the community.22

Employee Ownership and
Collective Bargaining

The Worker Freedom of Association Policy metric indicates
whether the organization has a written policy to monitor,
2
evaluate, and ensure its workers' freedom of association.

220. IRIS+ System I About, IRIS+, https://iris.thegiin.org/history/ https://perma.cc/NLK9QS9V].
221. Id.
222. Amit Bouri, How StandardsEmerge The Role ofInvestorLeadership in Realizing the
PotentialofIRIS, 6 INNOVATIONS 117, 118, 122 (2011).
223. Governance Policies, IRIS+ (2019), https://iris.thegiin.org/metric/5.0/oi2330/
[https://perma.cc/NW2L-YFJZ].
224. Community Engagement Strategy, IRIS+
(2019),
https://iris.thegiin.org/
metric/5.0/oi2319/ [https://perma.cc/D2EA-76P8].
225. Worker Freedom of Association Policy, IRIS+,
https://iris.thegiin.org/
metric/5.0/oi4364/ [https://perma.cc/CSP6-JMEN].
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Table 1. Summary of American Fourth Sector Standards
Sustainable Accounting Standard Board (SASB)
Year Founded

2011226

Location

227
San Francisco, U.S.

Mission

SASB standards help businesses around the world identify,
manage, and report on the sustainability topics that matter most
to their investors. "Sustainability accounting reflects the
corporation's management of environmental and social impacts
arising from the production of goods and services, as well as its
management of the environmental and social capitals necessary
to create long-term value." 22 8

Key Corporate Governance SASB's sustainability topics are organized under five broad
Metrics
sustainability dimensions: environment, social capital, human
capital, business model and innovation, and leadership and
governance. Leadership and governance "involves the
management of issues that are inherent to the business model or
common practice in the industry and that are in potential conflict
with the interest of broader stakeholder groups[.]" When in
conflict, these issues "create a potential for liability or limitation
or removal of a license to operate. This includes regulatory
compliance, risk management, safety management, supply chain
and materials sourcing, conflicts of interest, anticompetitive
2 29
behavior, and corruption and bribery."
Beneficiary Participation
and Engagement

This standard includes a discussion of community engagement
processes to identify and mitigate concerns regarding a project's
environmental and community impacts. The metric for
community relations values the processes to manage risks and
20
opportunities associated with community rights and interests.

226. The SASB Foundation Board of Directors, STANFORD SOC. INNOVATION REV.,

https://www.sasb.org/governance/foundation-board/ [https://penna.cc/8M6Y-7EF7].
227. Contact Us, STANFORD

SOC. INNOVATION REV., https://www.sasb.org/contact/

[https://perma.cc/5THW-L9FM].
228. See Why SASB?, STANFORD SOC. INNOVATION REV., https://www.sasb.org/
[https://perma.cc/NC8J-R3UY].
229. Materiality Map, SUSTAINABILITY ACCT. STANDARDS BD., https://www.sasb.org/
standards-overview/materiality-map/ [https://perma.cc/2MQ2-WVPS].
230. See id.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol72/iss1/7

32

Pileri: Democratizing the Fourth Sector: B Corps and Beneficiary Particip
2020]

DEMOCRATIZING THE FOURTH SECTOR

115

Table 1. Summary of American Fourth Sector Standards
Employee Ownership and
Collective Bargaining

2.

The Labor Relations metric incorporates a metric for the
percentage of active workforce covered under collectivebargaining agreements, broken down by U.S. and foreign
231
employees.

International Certifying and Standards-Setting
Emphasize Beneficiary Participation

International organizations'

social enterprise

Bodies

and impact investing

metrics and standards place a higher premium on beneficiary participation
than do American organizations. 232 This is particularly true in continental
Europe, where stakeholder participation generally and worker participation

specifically have long been features of corporate law and design. 233 In
Germany, for example, half of German companies' supervisory board seats
must be comprised of workers' representatives. 234 By building on this history,
European models place companies' intended beneficiaries within an
enterprise's decision-making apparatus more often than their American
counterparts. 235
This approach is not surprising given that European law has a history of
employee board representation and stakeholder governance. The tradition of
codetermination likely primed standards-setting organizations to focus on the
participation of companies' and transactions' intended beneficiaries. As a
result, many international social enterprise-certifying organizations have

metrics and structures grounded in the tradition of codetermination and trade
unions.236

231. See, e.g., SUSTAINABILITY ACCT. STANDARDS BD., AIRLINES: SUSTAINABILITY

ACCOUNTING STANDARD 8 (2014), https://www.sasb.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/
TR0201_ProvisionalStandard _Airlines.pdf [https://perma.cc/V82K-UW5X].
232. See infra Table 2.
233. See Jackson, supra note 187, at 310-11. Many European countries required that
workers actually be represented on company boards of directors. Id.
234. Id. at 311. Nineteen countries require that workers be represented on the board of
directors of either large private companies or state-owned enterprises. Board-level
Representation, WORKER-PARTICIPATION.EU, http://www.worker-participation.eu/NationalIndustrial-Relations/Across-Europe/Board-level-Representation2
[https://perma.cc/U8PKRZES].
235. See Jackson, supra note 187, at 310.
236. Id. Senator Elizabeth Warren has proposed the Accountable Capitalism Act, which
includes a provision that at least forty percent of board of director seats of large American
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Table 2. Summary of International Standards
Outcomes Matrix
Year Founded

2012237

Location

23
London, U.K. 1

Mission

The Outcomes Matrix is a free tool to help organizations plan
and measure their social impact. It was developed by Big Society
Capital in partnership with social investment financial
intermediaries, front line organizations and impact experts
including the Good Analyst, New Philanthropy Capital, Social
Value International, and Triangle Consulting. 239

Key Corporate Governance
Metrics

These metrics include outcomes and measures for nine outcome
2
areas and fifteen beneficiary groups.

Beneficiary Participation and Metrics focus on institutional and organizational engagement
Engagement
with stakeholders (e.g. engagement through consultation with
employees or parents at schools and employee/parent
participation in decision-making), as well as levels of
stakeholder involvement in the provision of services and in their
21
employment, training, and education.
Employee Ownership and
Collective Bargaining

Opportunities for collective
bargaining
22
representation are viewed favorably.

and

worker

Social Return on Investment (SROI)
Year Founded

2007243

corporations be selected by employees. At the time of writing, this remains a proposal. Benjamin
Swasey, Warren Bill Would Have A Big Corporation'sEmployees Elect Nearly Half Of Board
Members,
WBUR:
BOSTONOMIX
(Aug.
15,
2018),
https://www.wbur.org/bosto
nomix/2018/08/15/warren-co-determination-capitalism-act [https://penna.cc/C8A7-6W9C].
237. Outcomes Matrix, GIIN IMPACT TOOLKIT, https://impacttoolkit.thegiin.org/
outcomes-matrix/ [https://perma.cc/4QZD-WAQM].
238. The Outcomes Matrix, GOOD FIN., https://goodfinance.org.uk/impact-matrix
[https://perma.cc/U4BH-79QX].
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. See Outcomes Matrix - Employment,

Training, and Education, GOOD FIN.,

https://www.goodfinance.org.uk/impact-matrix/filter/93 [https://perma.cc/7CYQ-NZET].
242. See Matt Black, Helping Hand to Secure Investment, GOOD FIN. (Apr. 9, 2018),
https://www.goodfinance.org.uk/latest/post/blog/helping-hand-secure-investment
[https://perma.cc/WB2D-UEHQ] (pointing readers towards employee ownership experts).
243. About Us, SOC. VALUE UK, http://www.socialvalueuk.org/about-social-value-uk/
[https://perma.cc/X8RX-C5KW].
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Table 2. Summary of International Standards
Location

Liverpool, U.K. 2 4

Mission

SROI is the application of a set of principles to map out impact.
This provides a consistent approach to understanding and
managing impact with the flexibility to respond to different
activities in different organizations with different stakeholders.
The SROI method provides a clear process for determining what
drives value within an organization and helps an organization
determine which outcomes resulting from an activity should be
24 5
managed.

Key Corporate Governance
Metrics

SROI is closely aligned with ethical governance and social
responsibility. 2 46

Beneficiary Participation and SROI is premised on seven principles. "Involve stakeholders" is
Engagement
the first.247 "Stakeholders are those people or organisations that
experience change as a result of your activity - and they are best
placed to describe the change. This Principle means that
stakeholders need to be identified and then consulted throughout
the analysis. This means that the value and the way that it is
measured, is informed by those affected by, or who affect, the
248
activity."
Employee Ownership and
Collective Bargaining

SROI is silent on employee ownership and collective bargaining.

EMES
Year Founded

1996249

Location

Liege, Belg.250

244. What is Social Value?, SOC. VALUE UK, http://www.socialvalueuk.org/what-issocial-value/ [https://penna.cc/E8F9-KTRT].
245. Id.
246. Alexandros Antonaras et al., MeasuringSocialReturn on Investment Using the EBEN
GR Business Ethics Excellence Model, 6 VERSLO IR TEISES AKTUALIJOS [CURRENT ISSUES OF

Bus. & L.] 69 (2010).
247. SOCIAL VALUE UK, A GUIDE TO SOCIAL RETURN ON INVESTMENT 1, 9 (2012),

http://www.socialvalueuk.org/app/uploads/2016/03/The%20 Guide%20to%20 Social%20Retur
n%20on%20Investment%202015.pdf [https://perma.cc/YY24-R5DC].
248. SOCIAL VALUE INTERNATIONAL, STANDARD ON APPLYING PRINCIPLE 1: INVOLVE

STAKEHOLDERS VERSION
2.0 3 (2019), http://www.socialvalueuk.org/app/uploads/
2019/06/Standard-on-Stakeholder-Involvement-V2.0-FINAL-i.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RND2TRYK].
249. Who We Are, EMES INT'L RSCH. NETWORK, https://emes.net/who-we-are/
[https://perma.cc/UL26-KWBQ].
250. Id.
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Table 2. Summary of International Standards
Mission

EMES is a network of established university research centers
and individual researchers whose goal has been to gradually
build up an international corpus of theoretical and empirical
knowledge pluralistic in disciplines and methodologies
around four "SE" concepts: social enterprise, social
entrepreneurship, social economy, and solidarity economy and
social innovation. The nine criteria defining the social enterprise
include decision-making power not based solely on capital
ownership and participatory nature but which also involves other
parties affected by the company's activity.21

Key Corporate Governance
Metrics

The research group has not formulated standards or indicators to
measure social enterprises. However, the EMES approach
22
focuses on social, economic, and political dimensions.

Beneficiary Participation and The EMES approach favors participatory governance. The ideal
Engagement
EMES social enterprise is based on collective dynamics and
involvement of different stakeholders in the governance of the
organization. In many cases, social enterprises aim to foster
democracy at the local level through economic activity, among
other things. The decision-making power is not based on capital
ownership, and it reflects the quest for more economic
23
democracy in the line of the cooperative tradition.
Employee Ownership and
Collective Bargaining

Work Integration Social Enterprise models in Europe encourage
24
workers to participate in the decision-making process.
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI)

Year Founded

199725

Location

2 56
Amsterdam, Neth.

Mission

GRI helps businesses and governments worldwide understand
and communicate their impact on critical sustainability issues

251. Focus Areas, EMES INT'L RSCH. NETWORK, https://emes.net/focus-areas/
[https://perma.cc/JTJ2-GBYA].
252. Id.
253. Victor Pestoff, The Role of ParticipatoryGovernance in the EMES Approach to
Social Enterprise, 2 J. ENTREPRENEURIAL & ORGANIZATIONAL DIVERSITY 48, 54 (2013);
Focus Areas, supra note 251.
254. Catherine Davister et al., Work IntegrationSocial Enterprisesin the European Union:

An Overview ofExisting Models 21 (Eur. Rsch. Network, Working Paper No. 04/04, 2004).
255. Mission & History, GRI, https://www.globalreporting.org/about-gri/mission-history/
[https://perma.cc/Q6T9-5N5V].
256. Id.
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Table 2. Summary of International Standards
such as climate change, human rights, governance, and social
well-being. 27
Key Corporate Governance
Metrics

GRI governance standards focus on the organization's
governance structure and the highest governance body's role in
setting the organization's purpose, values, and strategy. 2 8

Beneficiary Participation and Standards require that organizations implement local community
Engagement
engagement. Stakeholders are consulted on how to build
reporting standards and the effect of the enterprise on
stakeholders. The governance structure has elements of a list of
stakeholder groups, and it identifies and selects stakeholders'
approach to stakeholder engagement. 259
Employee Ownership and
Collective Bargaining

Standards favor freedom of association, which includes the right
of workers to collectively bargain the terms and conditions of
work. The social standards under GRI have a topic-specific
standard on freedom of association and collective bargaining.
The disclosures in this standard can provide information about
how an organization's impacts are related to freedom of
association and collective bargaining and how the organization
manages these impacts. 20

III. WAYS TO DEMOCRATIZE THE FOURTH SECTOR

Certifying organizations like B Lab have an opportunity to promote

intended beneficiaries' meaningful participation in B Corp governance and
the Fourth Sector. Certifying organizations should articulate social and
environmental goals and implement them at the individual company level
through participatory mechanisms. 261 B Corp certification should require that

257. About GRI, GRI, https://www.globalreporting.org/Information/about-gri/Pages/
default.aspx [https://penna.cc/X34B-N4J4] (describing the purpose and goals of GRI).
258. GRI 102: General Disclosures, GRI 18 (2016), https://www.global
reporting.org/standards/gri-standards-download-center/?g=51e0294b-d263 -48b3-9ff1 -f06f989
40200 [https://penna.ccIH3F5-A8N7].
259. GRI 413: Local Communities, GRI 4, 6 (2016), https://www.global
reporting.org/standards/gri-standards-download-center/?g=51e0294b-d263 -48b3-9ffl -f06f989
40200 [https://perma.cc/5G65-DS68].
260. GRI 407: Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining, GRI 4 (2016),
https://www.globalreporting.org/standards/gri-standards-download-center/gri-407-freedom-ofassociation-and-collective-bargaining-2016/ [https://perma.cc/5FRK-QXWN].
261. Charles Sabel, Dewey, Democracy, and Democratic Experimentalism, 9 Contemp.
Pragmatism 35, 44-45 (2012) ("[A successful New Governance program] begins with
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companies involve beneficiaries at every stage in the life of a B Corp,
including designing, implementing, and evaluating the company. This Section

first contends that B Corp certification should look to New Governance theory
and Democratic Experimentalism to empower stakeholders and
beneficiaries. 262 It also proposes reforms to B Corp certification that take into
account prerequisite conditions for effective beneficiary participation and are
mindful of the limitations of such participation.
This Section does not intend to articulate a complete set of standards that
B Lab should implement; this Article anticipates an iterative process in which
B Lab first articulates principles and then develops standards as B Corps and
beneficiaries experiment with participatory models. This Section, therefore,
attempts to articulate principles of beneficiary participation within B Corps

that satisfy some, if not all, of the conditions for successful New Governance
participation, particularly among marginalized beneficiaries. This Section

introduces key concepts of New Governance, its benefits and limitations, and
its application to corporate governance. It pays special attention to whether

participation is feasible in B Corp governance and what prerequisites must
exist to make that participation work.
Participatory corporate governance mechanisms can take the form of
procedures that (1) involve beneficiaries in designing the company and
making major decisions 263 or (2) give intended beneficiaries certain
enforcement rights, such as the right to sue the company. 264 This Section also
identifies examples of beneficiary participation as currently practiced and
evaluates those examples against the general principles articulated in Section
III.B below. In doing so, this Section highlights best practices and suggests

models for adoption by individual B Corps.
As used here, "beneficiary participation" rises above the level of
stakeholder engagement endorsed by many of the standards-setting
organizations listed in Section IID. Rather, the level of participation this

agreement at the highest-level jurisdiction (for example, the federal level in the US, the Union
level in the European Union) on broad framework goals. Lower level actors (the states in the
US, the member states in the EU, or administrative agencies acting through their local units or
in collaboration with state or member state administrations) are given discretion to advance the
general goals in their own way, but on condition that they elaborate either by themselves, and
more typically with others, standards that specify the goals and set metrics for gauging progress
towards them. Lower level experience is then periodically compared against the backdrop of
these standards and metrics, and these comparisons of implementation experience call attention
to the need for either changes in particular lower-level administrations or revisions of the
standards and metrics, or the framework law or some combination of all of them.").
262. See infra notes 271, 277.
263. See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 158, at 865.
264. See, e.g., MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS.
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Article suggests requires that beneficiaries (or their representatives) be clearly
identified and empowered in the company and that the company be
accountable to those beneficiaries or representatives.
A.

New Governance and DemocraticExperimentalism

New Governance theory-a theory based on the work of John Dewey 265
which was first suggested in public program design 266 but later applied to
corporate governance267-gives a framework for standards-setting bodies,
such as B Lab, to set beneficiary participation as an aspiring goal for

individual B Corps. New Governance seeks to shift decision-making power
within a program away from those who traditionally hold power and toward
a wider set of participants.268 New Governance programs are characterized by
"[i]nclusiveness,
decentralized problem solving,
and learning-bydoing .... " 2 69 Both private and public stakeholders collaborate to "create,
implement, and
structures."270

continually

renegotiate

programmatic

goals

and

Under New Governance, local stakeholders experiment with program
design, and a central authority identifies best practices and attempts to
standardize and replicate them elsewhere. 271New Governance recognizes that
"all stakeholders affected by a problem should be engaged in the process of
solving it." 272 Regulators identify a policy failure and encourage programs to

innovate within a given framework to address that failure rather than institute
top-down mandates. 273 The participation of local stakeholders, in particular,
is important at every stage in this experimentation and monitoring process,

which is constructed in a deliberate manner and may involve nongovernmental organizations' cooperation. 274

265. Sabel, supra note 261, at 35.
266. See, e.g., Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of
Governance in ContemporaryLegal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 343-44 (2004).
267. See, e.g., Tamara C. Belinfanti, Shareholder Cultivation and New Governance, 38

DEL. J. CORP. L. 789, 792 (2014).
268. Jaime Alison Lee, "Can You Hear Me Now? ": Making ParticipatoryGovernance

Work for the Poor, 7 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 405, 415 (2013).
269. Id. at 410.
270. Wendy A. Bach, Governance, Accountability, and the New Poverty Agenda, 2010
Wis. L. REV. 239, 256.
271. See Cristie Ford, New Governance in the Teeth of Human Frailty: Lessons from
FinancialRegulation, 2010 Wis. L. REV. 441, 483-85.
272. Lee, supra note 268, at 409.
273. See Belinfanti, supra note 267, at 794-95 (applying New Governance theory to the
problem of incongruity between shareholders and management).
274. See Lee, supra note 268, at 410-11.
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New Governance emerged in recent years as a critique of the perceived
top-down style of program management that was common in public
programs. 275 Programs that embrace New Governance are characterized by a
collaboration between government and local stakeholders, particularly
intended beneficiaries of those programs.276 In espousing these collaborations,
New Governance strives to create programs and policies that better meet the
government's need and facilitate democratic engagement and empowerment
among the citizenry. 277

Scholars point to many benefits of the New Governance approach,

including a program's increased efficacy. 278 In considering the viewpoints of
multiple stakeholders to a program's monitoring and design, New Governance

brings multiple perspectives and approaches to a problem. 279 Structured
correctly, a program that utilizes New Governance can be particularly helpful
in promoting the participation of marginalized groups. Marginalized groups'

participation in a program intended for their benefit can result in increased
accountability over those programs as those groups contain invaluable
information and perspectives. 280
Applied to corporate governance, New Governance seeks to promote both

regulatory compliance and innovation within corporate design and
management. 281 New Governance in the corporate context identifies market
failures and promotes changes in corporate behavior to address those

275. See Bach, supra note 270, at 255-56.
276. See ORLY LOBEL, New Governance as Regulatory Governance, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF GOVERNANCE 65, 65 (David Levi-Faur ed., 2012).
277. See Bach, supra note 270, at 259. Democratic Experimentalism similarly provides a
theoretical basis under which B Corp design can utilize a participatory process to create a public
benefit. Entities organized pursuant to Democratic Experimentalism feature broad governing
norms benefit for a specific stakeholder or set of stakeholders in the case of a B Corp and
utilizes flexible, collaborate processes to advance these norms. See Charles F. Sabel & William
H. Simon, Democratic Experimentalism, in SEARCHING FOR CONTEMPORARY LEGAL
THOUGHT (Justin Desautels-Stein & Christopher Tomlins, eds., forthcoming 2017) (manuscript
at 8-9) (on file with the South Carolina Law Review). Local actors are responsible for
implementing programs but are ultimately accountable to some central authority. See id.
(manuscript at 9). Under Democratic Experimentalism, multiple perspectives brought by
stakeholders of an entity are seen as fonts of knowledge for the group rather than hindrances to
efficient decision-making. See id. (manuscript at 4). The resulting corporate activity is, therefore,
the result of the input of a range of stakeholders orbeneficiaries and relies on participation rather
than markets or bureaucracy to produce benefit for an intended stakeholder. See id. (manuscript
at 10).
278. Lee, supra note 268, at 406.
279. See id. at 412.
280. See id.
281. Belinfanti, supra note 267, at 808.
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failures.212 A New Governance model views the corporate form as a forum
through which various stakeholders can negotiate among themselves. 283 As
explained in Section IIB, tension in corporate governance often arises from
the misalignment of interests between various corporate stakeholders,
including directors, managers, shareholders, and creditors. 28 4 The Fourth
Sector attempts to integrate another external stakeholder's interests into those
stakeholder relationships. 285 A New Governance approach to corporate
governance in the Fourth Sector facilitates negotiation among these
competing interests, providing a structure through which designated
beneficiaries can participate alongside more entrenched corporate actors. 28 6 B
Corps require participatory governance structures so these negotiations can
take place. 28 7

B Corps should first identify a goal of furthering certain stakeholder
interests and then be given the flexibility to create and implement structures
that allow for beneficiary participation in a way that is best suited to a
particular stakeholder's needs. Focusing on B Corp standards rather than
regulatory reform at this point allows companies to experiment with
participatory corporate governance structures. A focus on B Corp standards

may also prevent a race to the bottom in which companies incorporate in or
move to a jurisdiction with the most lenient legal regime. 288 In attempting to
adhere to B Lab's standards, B Corps will act as laboratories of corporate
governance, taking advantage of a mix of the mechanisms set forth below.
Lessons will be learned, best practices can be developed, and effective
mechanisms can be disseminated throughout the industry and promoted by the
standards-setting bodies. 289
Structural support for participation is necessary for successful New
Governance systems, 290 and a non-governmental organization, such as B Lab,
is an apt vehicle to promote beneficiary participation. Aside from enacting
benefit corporation legislation, there is little government regulation around B

282. Id. at 804. These failures can be the result of the interaction of regulations and market
actors. Id. Examples of such failures include the subprime mortgage crisis and resulting 2008
financial crisis. Id.
283. See id. at 807-08.
284. See id. at 806.
285. See id. at 815.
286. See id. at 872.
287. See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 301(a) (BENEFIT CORP. 2017).
288. Marco Ventoruzzo, The Role of Comparative Law in Shaping Corporate Statutory
Reforms, 52 DUQ. L. REV. 151, 155, 160 n.40 (2014).
289. Lee, supra note 268, at 410.
290. Id. at 435.
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Corps and related Fourth Sector companies. 291 Without government
regulation, standards-setting organizations like B Lab are best positioned to
promote beneficiary participation while allowing for the kind of flexibility
and experimentation discussed above. 292 As these fields grow and develop,
standards-setting organizations like B Lab will be on the cutting edge of best
practices in the industry. 293 Efforts to standardize practices in the Fourth
Sector are still in their relatively nascent stages and should continue as the
space expands. 294

New Governance is not without limitations, however. Participatory
processes are costly in both time and money-they require careful design and
capacity building among stakeholders initially, and even then, coordination of
various stakeholder groups can be trying. 295 The principles set forth in Section
III.B acknowledge these limitations and attempt to promote the positives of
New Governance design while minimizing the harms of participatory
processes. For example, some have criticized the reliance on third-party
organizations to set standards for Fourth Sector entities in lieu of regulation. 296
Scholars have pointed out that these organizations couple a lack of
prescriptive rules with weak (or no) enforcement powers 297 or may be
susceptible to undue influence from certain stakeholders (particularly if those

291. See supra Section II.A. Nor have there been significant regulatory developments that
apply to impact investing. See supra Section II.A.
292. Dadush, supra note 92, at 424 ("The previous sections elucidated the roles that GIIRS
and IRIS play in governance, as interventions that create structures for and influence decisionmaking by impact investors, investees, and official policy-makers, particularly during the
marketbuilding stage. These manifestations of indicator-power are relatively concrete. At a more
abstract level, indicators also act as powerful knowledge producers, influencing not only
decision outcomes, but also the very process of decision-making, fundamentally altering the
values and the logics involved."). So-called "soft law" regimes, through which enforcement of
some norm is through "informal social pressures rather than material sanctions," has been seen
as an alternative to "hard law" enforcement when legal regimes lack capacity for such
enforcement. Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in the
Administrative State, 100 GEo. L.J. 53, 81 (2011). Standards-setting bodies like B Lab can be
said to be engaging in private lawmaking, operating largely without the scrutiny of "hard law"
regimes. See David V. Snyder, PrivateLawmaking, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 371 (2003).
293. Id. at 419 ("Until government assumes explicit regulatory functions within the impact
investing sphere, the fact that both IRIS and GIIRS have financially and reputationally strong
networks of supporters, and that they currently have no direct competition, lends credence to the
view that stakeholders will come to rely on them as the primary rule-setters and governors of
the social investing space.").
294. See id.
295. See Lee, supra note 268, at 412-13.
296. Reiser, supra note 48, at 611.
297. Id. at 624.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol72/iss1/7

42

Pileri: Democratizing the Fourth Sector: B Corps and Beneficiary Particip
2020]

DEMOCRATIZING THE FOURTH SECTOR

125

stakeholders wield disproportionate wealth). 298 Large impact investors, for
example, who are not eager to share corporate power with intended
beneficiaries may lean on entities such as B Lab to promulgate favorable
standards that curb nonshareholder stakeholders' influence. Despite professed
alignment with beneficiary groups, impact investors are necessarily
compelled by a portfolio company's bottom line-even the most sociallyminded investors do not want to make unprofitable investments. These
disagreements could exist between other corporate constituencies-a
company's workforce could be opposed to hiring undocumented workers, for
example, even if a local immigrant community is articulated as a company
beneficiary. Recall that Etsy listed employees, neighbors, members, partners,
and the environment as key beneficiaries. Whose preference will become
company policy?

The proposals articulated in this Article attempt to address these critiques.
First, the B Corp certification's marketing value is such that, even without
other enforcement capabilities, the risk of losing this certification ought to be
sufficient to encourage companies to engage in compliant behavior299_
though Etsy is a clear example of the opposite. 300 Second, focusing on
articulating goals rather than particular structures will lessen the incentives
for stakeholders to "capture" standards-setting bodies such as B Lab. Powerful
stakeholders will instead engage in a process of sorting out competing
incentives on the individual enterprise level, as is the case in traditional
corporations. This process of self-governance

through experimentation,

monitoring, and adaptation is key to the New Governance model. 30i
A New Governance frame allows for B Lab to promote the development
of participatory structures that are well-suited to a B Corp's specific

298. See Rutsel S.J. Martha & Sarah Dadush, Going Against the Grain: When Private
Rules Shouldn't Apply to PublicInstitutions, 9 INT'L ORGs. L. REv. 87, 100 (2012).
299. Richard Stammer, It Pays to Become a B Corporation, HARV. BUS. REv. (Dec. 6,
2016), https://hbr.org/2016/12/it-pays-to-become-a-b-corporation
[https://penna.cc/LK86U4TE].
300. Martha & Dadush, supra note 298, at 102. Among the values of certification like B
Corp status is that these certifications signal something about the sustainability of a good or
service, allowing a company to charge a premium for that good or service. Margaret Chon,
Marks ofRectitude, 77 FORDHAM L. REv. 2311, 2313 (2009).
301. Sabel, supra note 261, at 44 ("The shift towards experimentalist lawmaking requires
complementary changes in the way laws are constructed and the way they are administered or
applied to various contexts: the law has to encourage adaption and revision when applied in
context; the contextual adaption has to make possible the detection of local error, permit learning
across contexts, and prompt reconsideration of the original legislation when, on reflection,
necessary.").
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beneficiary and corporate mission.30 2 Future iterations of B Corp standards
can then endorse certain actions and elevate best practices in the field. The
following Section elaborates on these goals and highlights participatory
practices from the field.
B.

The PracticalInvolvement of B Corp Beneficiaries

B Lab ought to require that, in setting beneficiary participation as a

criterion for certification, B Corps comply with the following three principles:
(1) that intended beneficiaries are clearly identified; (2) that beneficiaries are
involved in designing, implementing, and evaluating the B Corp; and (3) that

the B Corp is accountable to those beneficiaries.
This Article argues that the efficacy of B Corps-that is, the ability to
create or promote some stated social or environmental benefit-will be
harmed absent intended beneficiaries' input. Even if metrics can be developed
where standard analysis of the effect of B Corps on nonshareholder
stakeholders can be objectively measured, this Article argues that even such
measurement fails absent beneficiary participation. Instead, an intended
benefit should be measured on terms set forth by the intended beneficiaries
and not aloof corporate persons or distant standards-setting bodies. Drawing
on the work of Bill Simon and Chuck Sabel, among others, Jaime Lee argues
that two preconditions are necessary for successful participation in New
Governance Design: (1) the parties must be motivated toward some common
goal and (2) participants within a program or enterprise must recognize the

value of the other participants' contributions. 303 The three principles
articulated in this Section seek to satisfy these preconditions.
Given the difficulties of measuring outcomes in this space, this Article
prefers an emphasis on process rather than outcome. 304 Under New

302. Id. at 89 ("[Blest practices often become benchmarks for a wide range of institutions,
notwithstanding fundamental institutional differences.... [T]he adoption of externally
generated rules must be pursued in a systematically cautious, critical and coordinated manner in
order to avoid producing practices that run against the very grain of a public institution's
constitution and mandate.... [R]obust governance structures are necessary to avoid institutional
digressions.").
303. Lee, supra note 268, at 422. Pragmatists in the Dewian tradition have long favored
such an emphasis on process, particularly processes that involved "provisionality and
experiment." Sabel & Simon, supra note 277, at 3.
304. Outcome and process are termed "product" and "process" in international trade law,
with "product" referring to information about the product itself and "process" referring to how
the product is produced, including "the labor conditions of workers who produce a consumer
good, the environmental effects of a good's production, the use of controversial engineering
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Governance models, the level of stakeholder participation can exist at
different points on a continuum. 30 Preserving flexibility should be a higher
priority than endorsing a particular arrangement, and beneficiaries themselves
deserve to have input in the design of participatory structures rather than
having those structures thrust upon them.
Two organizations based in Boston, Massachusetts, certify or promote
Fourth Sector enterprises through championing beneficiary participation. The

Boston Ujima Project promotes community-based economic development in
Boston, Massachusetts, by certifying and funding companies that embrace a
participatory approach. 306 Every year, the Boston Ujima Project certifies

thirty-six companies that satisfy eight "Good Business" categories as
members of the Ujima Business Alliance.3 07 These categories include a
"commitment to employee ownership" and "[s]tructures that empower
employees in relevant decisions" and "incorporate consumer governance or
maintain robust feedback channels. . . "308 Among the benefits of
membership in the Ujima Business Alliance are exposure, access to technical
assistance, reputational benefits, and a connection to anchor institutions like
universities that support participatory companies.309

Similarly, Transform Finance is an organization that promotes alternative
financial models by convening a network of impact investors, producing
research and case studies, and providing advisory services to impact
investors. 310 Among Transform Finance's focus areas are fostering employee
ownership and developing a methodology to measure the effectiveness of
impact investing projects.31 ' Key to Transform Finance's work is the idea that
an enterprise's ownership and control can be separated such that a company's

techniques such as genetic modification to create a good, or any number of other social,
economic, or environmental circumstances that are related causally to a consumer product."
Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process/ProductDistinction and the

Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 525, 528-29 (2004).
305. See Sherry R. Arnstein, A Ladder of Citizen Participation,35 J. AM. INST. PLANNERS
216, 217 (1969) (comparing levels of participation to ladder rungs). For a discussion of other
frameworks for participation, see Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Collaborative Governance:
Emerging Practicesand the Incomplete Legal Frameworkfor Public and Stakeholder Voice,

2009 J. DIsP. RESOL. 269, 291-92.
306. See
Another
Boston
is
Possible,
BOS.
UJIMA
PROJECT,
https://www.ujimaboston.com/ [https://perma.cc/G36L-VXF2].
307. Rewrite the Rules, BOS. UJIMA PROJECT, https://www.ujimaboston.com/standards

[https://perma.cc/KL85-5YUT].
308. Id. (listing all eight "Good Business" categories).
309. Telephone Interview with Charles Wallace-Thomas IV (Jan. 7, 2020).
FIN.,
http://transfornfinance.org/ourwork
310. Our
Work,
TRANSFORM

[https://perma.cc/X26E-MD8Y].
311. Id.
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stakeholders can have a say in the governance of the enterprise without being

owners. 3 12
To varying degrees, the work of the Boston Ujima Project and Transform
Finance satisfy the three criteria laid out above. The following Section
expounds on these organizations' efforts and provides examples of enterprise
and transaction design that comply with these criteria. Many of these
examples involve the use of guaranteed board representation or grants of
equity ownership in an enterprise to give some beneficiary group participatory
rights in the governance of a company. 313 Empowering workers through

cooperative structures, grants of equity, or pension fund ownership, for
example, is well established. 314 This Section examines these arrangements and
explores how they can be extended to other beneficiary groups. This Section
also examines participatory mechanisms that do not involve a company's
ownership in the context of a broad set of potential beneficiaries.
1.

ClearlyIdentified Beneficiariesor Representatives

B Corps should clearly and narrowly identify their intended beneficiaries
and, if necessary, identify a representative of those beneficiaries. 315 Most
obviously, identifying a specific beneficiary allows a B Corp to target its
efforts to a certain goal or beneficiary. Amorphous sets of beneficiaries, on
the other hand, introduce such a diverse set of interests that it can be hard (if
not impossible) for all stakeholders to agree on a common goal for the
enterprise.

Several scholars note that the new corporate forms fail to sufficiently
narrow the scope of these corporations' beneficiaries. 316 Legislation
authorizing the benefit corporation form, for example, has been criticized for
its lack of guidance in requiring that benefit corporation management sift
through the company's effects on a variety of stakeholders in order to produce
a public benefit. 317 For example, the Model Benefit Corporation Legislation
requires directors to consider the corporate action's impact on nonshareholder

312. Telephone
Transformative

Interview with Andrea Armeni

Impact

Methodology

Tool,

(Jan.

6,

TRANSFORM

2020); Developing A
FIN.,

http://transform

finance.org/impact-methodology [https://penna.cc/L27Z-KUPR].
313. See supra Section II.D; see also infra note 337.
314. See generally Jackson, supra note 187.
315. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 301(a) (BENEFIT CORP. 2017).
316. See Alicia E. Plerhoples, Social Enterpriseas Commitment: A Roadmap, 48 WASH.
U. J.L. & POL'Y 89, 109 (2015) (noting criticism of other scholars in relation to model
legislation).
317. See Winston, supra note 40, at 1826; Plerhoples, supra note 316, at 110.
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stakeholders and the public. 318 Directors of Delaware public benefit
corporations are to "balance[] the pecuniary interests of the stockholders, the
best interests of those materially affected by the corporation's conduct, and
the specific public benefit or public benefits identified in its certificate of
incorporation." 319 Identifying a specific beneficiary or set of beneficiaries will
assist corporate directors and managers in understanding their obligations.
Narrowly defining an intended beneficiary also facilitates the
participation of that beneficiary. Group members such as workers or
community members may be granted a right to vote for a social enterprise's
management. For example, some companies give workers, through grants of

stock in the company or some other mechanism, the right to vote for board
members or on other issues. 320 Employees are, in fact, a common beneficiary
of B Corps and other Fourth Sector companies.3 21 Employee ownership has
long been championed as a method of encouraging corporate activity that is
responsive to the needs of its workforce.3 22 Further, workers are often seen as
more representative of other nonshareholder stakeholder groups, and
employee participation and ownership is often seen as an antidote to a narrow

focus on short-term profit seeking. 323

318. Reiser, supra note 48, at 598-99. Those nonshareholder stakeholders are defined in
the statute as:
(i) [T]he shareholders of the benefit corporation; (ii) the employees and work force
of the benefit corporation, its subsidiaries, and its suppliers; (iii) the interests of
customers as beneficiaries of the general public benefit or a specific public benefit
purpose of the benefit corporation; (iv) community and societal factors, including
those of each community in which offices or facilities of the benefit corporation, its
subsidiaries, or its suppliers are located; (v) the local and global environment; (vi) the
short-term and long-term interests of the benefit corporation, including benefits that
may accrue to the benefit corporation from its long-term plans and the possibility that
these interests may be best served by the continued independence of the benefit
corporation; and (vii) the ability of the benefit corporation to accomplish its general
public benefit purpose and any specific public benefit purpose in addition to any
additional groups listed in the benefit corporation's charter.
MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS.

§ 301(a)

(BENEFIT CORP. 2017).

319. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 365 (West, Westlaw through ch. 292 of the 150th General
Assembly).
320. See, e.g., infra note 345.
321. See supra Section II.B.
322. See Priya Baskaran, Introduction to Worker Cooperatives and Their Role in the
ChangingEconomy, 24 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 355, 360 (2015).
323. See id. at 361. Even worker representation has been subject to criticism, however.
Adding worker representation to a company's board of directors can present additional
transaction costs that hurt the profitability of the business. Some critics argue that employees
themselves can capture companies, looting corporate resources and rendering the company
valueless. For a discussion of these criticisms and a response to critiques, see Lenore Palladino,
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In situations where B Corps designate discrete groups, such as employees

as beneficiaries, it is appropriate for those groups to represent themselves by
exercising their participation rights (or by electing representatives by

exercising those same rights). In other situations, however, intended
beneficiaries may not be able to enjoy such direct participation and designing
participatory governance structures becomes progressively more difficult as

the designated beneficiary becomes larger and more amorphous. Some
companies or deals may designate communities outside the corporate
structure as the intended beneficiary, or it may be impractical to grant a
beneficiary group voting rights. B Corps could, for example, designate a very
large group, such as refugees, as a beneficiary. Cotopaxi, an outdoor apparel
and equipment brand, supports employment initiatives for refugees, but
Cotopaxi does not appear to grant "refugees" a role in the company's

governance-doing so for such a large group would be impracticable. 324 A
Fourth Sector company could also designate an environmental feature, such
as a nearby waterway, as its beneficiary. In the first case, identifying every
potential beneficiary to grant a right to vote to and then overseeing the
exercise of that right would be overly burdensome. In the second case, the
beneficiary is not a group of individuals at all.
If it is impractical or inappropriate to directly grant beneficiaries
participatory rights in a company or transaction, B Corps should identify and

empower a representative of the intended beneficiary. Proxies, such as
nonprofit organizations, labor unions, and other nongovernment
organizations, have been utilized in lieu of direct participation elsewhere.3 25
The selection of beneficiary representatives should comply with several basic
principles. First, representatives should be individuals who are independent of
the company and, aside from status as beneficiary representatives,
disinterested-the representative should not be a corporate insider.3 26 Further,

Worker Representation on U.S. Corporate Boards (Oct. 28, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with the South Carolina Law Review).
324. Mara Leighton, B CorpsAre Businesses Committed to Using TheirProfitfor Good

These 12 Are Making Some Truly Great Products, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 23, 2020, 3:04 PM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/b-corp-charitable-business-2018-8
[https://penna.cc/VDM7HQGU]. It is not clear that Cotopaxi grants refugees any participatory rights in the governance
of the company, and they are not required to do so by B Lab. Id.; see supra note 77 and
accompanying text.
325. See Lee, supra note 268, at 429.
326. The IRS includes current and former officers, directors, trustees, key employees,
family members thereof, and certain entities owned or controlled, in part, by those officers,
directors, trustees, and key employees in its definition of "Interested Persons." See INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV.,

INSTRUCTIONS FOR SCHEDULE L (FORM 990 OR 990-EZ)

1 (2019),

http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i990sl.pdf [https://perma.cc/K8EH-FAN3].
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designated representatives should be both appointed and removed by
beneficiaries themselves or, where impractical, by organizations representing
those beneficiaries' interests.3 27 For example, Cotopaxi may designate an
nongovernmental organization (NGO), whose membership is comprised of
refugees as the beneficiary representative, and grant that NGO participatory
rights.

To the extent that a B Corp names a beneficiary for whom a representative
is not easily identifiable, an independent nonprofit organization may assume
the role of beneficiary representative. In the case of a company that makes
infrastructure

investments

with purported

environmental

benefits,

for

example, an NGO whose charter lists a public purpose that is the same or
similar to the purpose espoused by the parties to the deal would be a suitable
representative.3 28 B Lab could play a role in this by naming a list of acceptable
beneficiary representatives for common beneficiary groups. Such an
organization's principals (i.e., board members and management) must satisfy
the same independence standard set forth above.
While clearly identifying a discrete beneficiary group or groups is
preferable, many B Corps name impersonal beneficiaries (the environment, in
Etsy's case) or even the public at large as beneficiaries of corporate activity.
In the case of companies who name the public at large as the beneficiary, state
regulation or disclosure may substitute for beneficiary participation. In charity
law, the government is seen as the appropriate representative for the public,
and both the IRS and state attorneys general are given powers to oversee
American charitable organizations.3 29 B Lab would not be able to grant the
government this kind of oversight role unilaterally, and statutory changes
would be required in each B Corp's state of incorporation. This may also
contradict one of goals of the B Corp movement, which is to encourage
companies to address social problems without the cumbersome regulations
that burden the charitable sector.
An alternative to a stronger role for government could be mandated
disclosure. Disclosure has been used as a mechanism to enforce human rights
compliance against private entities. In 2010, for example, California passed

the California Transparency in Supply Chains Act, which requires that
companies publicly disclose efforts to identify and ameliorate human rights

327. Substantive representation, in which an organization correctly perceives and even
shares a community's needs, should be distinguished from description representation, in which
an organization simply reflects a community's demographic and other traits. Susan D. Bennett,
Little Engines That Could: Community Clients, Their Lawyers, and Training in the Arts of
Democracy, 2002 Wis. L. REv. 469, 477-78.
328. See Winston, supra note 40, at 1836.
329. See infra Section II.C.2.
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abuses, such as human trafficking, in their supply chains. 330 Proponents of
disclosure believe that, armed with information about a company's practices,
customers and suppliers will put pressure on a company to address human
rights issues.
That said, corporate disclosure requirements regarding human rights

abuses have been widely critiqued and described as inefficient. Critics say that
these requirements lack sanction or remedies; that the information disclosed
is not widely known; and that customers, suppliers, and stakeholders have not
demonstrated an ability or willingness to push for company change or legal
reform as a result of this information.33' It is therefore unlikely public
disclosure of a B Corp's corporate practices will adequately guarantee that the
company is acting in the interest of the public at large.
2.

ParticipationatAll Stages

Beneficiaries, through their representatives, should be involved in all
stages of a B Corp's life: design, implementation, and evaluation. The design
phase includes identifying a B Corp's beneficiaries and consulting with those
beneficiaries in the development of the corporation's purpose and design of
corporate governance.33 2 Implementation refers to the ongoing governance of

the B Corp, and evaluation refers to the certification process itself and the set
of metrics by which the company's performance is judged.333
a.

Design

Rather than dictating a corporate purpose and set of beneficiaries, B Lab,
company founders, and beneficiaries themselves ought to have a say in
defining the enterprise's goal. Involving beneficiaries in a Fourth Sector
company's design means that beneficiaries and, if necessary, their
representatives should be identified early in the planning process. At some
point, of course, a decision has to be made about the goal of corporate activity.
This may take place before that beneficiary group is brought into the design

330. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.43 (West, Westlaw through ch. 372 of 2020 Reg. Sess.).
331. See, e.g., Marcia Narine, From Kansas to the Congo: Why Naming and Shaming
Corporationsthrough the Dodd-FrankAct's Corporate Governance Disclosure Won't Solve a
Human Rights Crisis, 25 REGENT U. L. REv. 351 (2012); Aaron A. Dhir, PoliticsofKnowledge
Dissemination: Corporate Reporting, Shareholder Voice, and Human Rights, 47 OSGOODE

HALL L.J. 47 (2009); Marcia Narine, Disclosing Disclosure 's Defects: Addressing Corporate
Irresponsibilityfor Human Rights Impacts, 47 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 84 (2015).
332. See Bach, supra note 270, at 287-88.
333. Id.
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process and certainly before implementation. Even the most well-intentioned
founders will bring their own biases and priorities to this selection of corporate
beneficiaries, and the articulation of corporate purpose may not necessarily
reflect the priorities of corporate stakeholders. That said, identifying
beneficiaries and seeking beneficiary consultation early is important, and B
Lab is well positioned to encourage and facilitate this consultation.
Excluding beneficiaries from initial corporate design, or at least an initial
articulation of corporate goals, is unavoidable to some extent. Although B
Corps should retain flexibility in defining their corporate purpose and
beneficiary designation, initial decisions necessarily anchor future activity. To
counter this, Fourth Sector entrepreneurs should conduct careful market
research that includes consultation with a wide set of stakeholders before
settling on a specific corporate purpose and intended beneficiary.
Entrepreneurs and funders should be encouraged to discuss beneficiary
identification as early as possible and, once they identify beneficiaries, should
consult them. Beneficiaries and their representatives can provide valuable
feedback as a B Corp articulates its goals and its governance structure begins
to take shape. They should also have a say in setting benchmarks by which B
Corps will judge their own success. Doing so allows for compromise in
defining a corporate purpose and creating a set of goals that reflects diverse
constituencies' needs and interests.
An example of participatory enterprise design can be seen in an investor

and a local community's participation in developing an enterprise to own and
operate a coffee mill in rural Colombia.334 In the mid-2010s, nonprofit
investment fund Acumen approached an association of coffee growers in rural
Colombia about supporting a project to assist those living in areas of the
country affected by decades of armed conflict.335 Acumen learned from the
growers that a wet mill, which allowed coffee growers to produce more and
higher quality coffee, was desirable.33 6 Acumen and the growers' association
formed the Gigante Central Wet Mill as a new enterprise to be jointly owned
by Acumen and the growers. Acumen made an initial debt and equity
investment in the mill, with equity ownership returning to the growers over

time. 337 Acumen set an initial goal but consulted a set of beneficiaries early in

334. See ANDREA ARMENI & MIGUEL FERREYRA DE BONE, MULTILATERAL INV. FUND,
INNOVATIONS IN FINANCING STRUCTURES FOR IMPACT ENTERPRISES: SPOTLIGHT ON LATIN

AMERICA 31 (2017), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/54cfca5be4bO6d2dOd7cOfld/t/
59aec6a0be42d663bf3db549/1504626340896/Transform-Finance-Innovations-in-FinancingStructures-for-Impact-Enterprises.pdf [https://penna.cc/QT89-6P3V].
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id.
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the process to find out what those beneficiaries needed most.338 Acumen then
spent time working with the growers to develop both a business plan and a
financial and governance structure that suited the growers' needs and
capacity. 339
b.

Implementation

Second, beneficiaries should be involved in implementing B Corps'
activities. As used here, participation is a higher standard than the stockholder
engagement that many American certifying organizations currently
encourage. 340 Broadly stated, participation requires that beneficiaries have
some input into the company's decision-making process. In determining the

level of participation, B Corps should have the flexibility to balance efficiency
and beneficiary input. Different constituencies have different decisionmaking authority within an enterprise (e.g., shareholders, boards, and officers
all have different authority), many of which are negotiated on individual
bases, and certifying bodies like B Lab should be mindful of the transaction
costs imposed by a complex decision-making process that involves another
set or sets of stakeholders. 34i Beneficiaries, therefore, ought to have a say in
large, strategic decisions within the company.
B Corps may be accountable to a company's intended beneficiaries by
granting those beneficiaries ownership through equity-voting representation

on the board that does not involve ownership or otherwise create management
structures that involve those beneficiaries. Both employees and others who
contribute capital to a company can be owners, but this Section contemplates
granting ownership rights based on membership in a beneficiary group.
Employee owners can be distinguished from other shareholders when they
receive ownership rights in exchange for their labor rather than contributions
of capital.342 Ben and Jerry's, for example, raised money by offering to sell

shares to Vermont residents to give Vermonters the chance to participate in
and benefit from the company's operations in that state. 343 Companies can
also grant corporate beneficiaries an ownership stake in the company, much
like union pension funds often hold stock in employers and use their voting

338. See id.
339. Id. at 32.
340. See supra Section II.D.
341. See Winston, supra note 40, at 1821.
342. See generally id. at 1795 (explaining the differences among managers, shareholders,
and various stakeholders such as employees and customers).
343. Bruce G. Posner, A Scoop of the Action, INC. (July 1, 1984), https://www.inc.com/
magazine/19840701/8016.html [https://penna.cc/JF66-SNTC].
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power to further employees' and pensioners' interests.344 Many worker
cooperatives, on the other hand, admit workers as owners solely in exchange
for service to the company.3 45 King Arthur Baking, for example, is a
prominent B Corp that utilizes 100% employee-ownership as one way to

achieve its mission of "bringing people together and building stronger
communities. "346

The rights and obligations of ownership groups can be varied as set forth
in the B Corp's governing documents or by contract. Nonshareholder
beneficiaries can exercise direct participatory rights by electing members of a
board of directors or other advisory board. This requires that board members
elected by those beneficiaries appoint (and fire) individuals with day-to-day
responsibilities within the company. In doing so, beneficiaries and their
representatives can set goals and strategies for the organization and have a say
in appointing individuals tasked with implementing those goals. Board seats

may be reserved for representatives elected by stakeholders and intended
beneficiaries, much like corporate law regimes in some countries reserve seats
for directors elected by workers. Social enterprises may also create
stakeholder advisory boards wherein stakeholders advise corporate decisionmakers on the impact of various corporate actions. 347
Employees also exercise participatory rights through collective
bargaining, and many European companies guarantee board representation to
workers without granting them ownership. 348 Other beneficiaries may

negotiate agreements

similar to community benefit agreements often

negotiated between real estate developers

and communities. 349 These

community benefit agreements include binding obligations related to
community needs on those developers. 35 0

344. Fairfax, supra note 126, at 85. See also Belinfanti, supra note 267, at 845-61, for a
discussion of "shares that have superior voting rights and economic rights, and which could be
issued to targeted shareholders who commit to fulfilling certain mission-sustaining
criteria ..... Id. at 796.
345. What
is a Worker Cooperative?, DEMOCRACY
AT
WORK
INST.,
https://institute.coop/what-worker-cooperative [https://penna.cc/U247-MXW5].
346. B-Corp Report Card, KING ARTHUR BAKING Co., https://www.kingarthur
baking.com/about/mission/b-corp-report [https://penna.cc/FY7A-YCQQ].
347. See J. Haskell Murray, Adopting StakeholderAdvisory Boards, 54 AM. BUS. L.J. 61,
94-98 (2017).
348. See supra Section II.D.
349. See Thomas A. Musil, The Sleeping Giant: Community Benefit Agreements and
Urban Development, 44 URB. L. 827, 829-30 (2012) (discussing community benefit agreements
in the real estate development context).
350. Id.
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In many states' corporate statutes, shareholders have the right to approve
fundamental transactions, such as a sale of the company. 35' Likewise, in B
Corps, major corporate actions, like the approval of a merger or the issuance
of shareholder dividends, should also hinge on beneficiary approval.
In individual transactions, beneficiaries and their representatives should
be engaged in designing the transaction, especially in crafting metrics and
conditions upon which the parties' financial obligations hinge. 352 In impact
investing deals, for example, beneficiaries should have a say in defining
benchmarks on which certain financial outcomes are based. Further,
approving beneficiaries or their representatives should be a key component of
contingent financial terms, such as debt repayment obligations.353 Correctly
designed, this strategic input should be strong enough to affect company
culture, trickling down to individuals who make day-to-day decisions within
the company but without creating unnecessary bureaucratic complexity. 354
Companies certified by the Boston Ujima Project must include workers
in their governance by granting workers at least one elected seat on a corporate
board, and outside investors and certified companies may not engage in union
blocking or intimidation. 355 Outside stakeholders do not get direct
participation rights, but certified companies must engage customers and
community members. 356 Elsewhere, the Boston Ujima Project encourages and

supports cooperative ownership models. 357 The Bowdoin Bike School, for
example, is a member of the Ujima Business Alliance and is working with the
Boston Center for Community Ownership to transform the business into a
worker-owned co-op so those who built Bowdoin Bike School will get an
opportunity to share ownership. 358

Transform Finance's methodology assesses an enterprise across four
categories, one of which is Enterprise Governance. 359 Companies are rated on
a scale of zero to three-zero being no inclusion of affected communities into
governance structure and three being cooperative democratic management
structures. 360 Notably, this category looks not only at worker participation in

351.
352.
353.
354.

See
See
See
See

Murray, supra note 347, at 67 n.32.
Burand, supra note 27, at 821.
id. at 784, 801-02, 818.
discussion infra Part IV.
355. Rewrite the Rules, supra note 307.
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. See Economy Builders, BOS. UJIMA PROJECT, https://www.ujimaboston.com/
economybuilders [https://perma.cc/QHL9-Z9WB].
359. See Developing A TransformativeImpact Methodology Tool, supra note 312.

360. Id.
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governance but also at a broad swath of a company's stakeholders. 36
Transform Finance's methodology, therefore, attempts to capture the amount
of both economic interest and governance that stakeholders have.3 62 Interested
companies can apply this methodology themselves or can request an audit
from Transform Finance.3 63 Transform Finance also authored a report on
using a private equity model to support conversions to employee ownership
structures. 364

In addition to designing a financing structure that returned more control
to the growers over time, Acumen worked with the local coffee growers to
build capacity to govern the enterprise. 365 Acumen recognized that this kind
of investment was required in addition to the capital investment they made in
the mill. So, while governance responsibilities are shared jointly at first, the
growers will gain more power over governing the mill as their capacity to
exercise that power grows. 366
c.

Evaluation

Finally, intended beneficiaries should be involved in evaluating a B
Corp's effectiveness. To satisfy this, beneficiaries and their representatives
can be involved in creating standards by which certified businesses are to be
judged.
The Boston Ujima Project heavily involves company beneficiaries in
evaluating the companies on the Ujima Business Alliance List. 367 Community
members nominate companies for inclusion on the Ujima Business Alliance
list,368 and a committee of representative business owners and NGO
employees, with the input of community members, determine the standards
by which those companies are judged. 369 These community members include
"current and displaced working-class Boston residents, grassroots partner
organizations, community business owners and their employees[.]"370
Community members can flag that a company listed on the Ujima Business

361. Id.
362. See id.
363. See Our Work, supra note 310.
364. See Our Projects, TRANSFORM FIN., http://transfornfinance.org/programs
[https://perma.cc/33HT-X3KV].
365. See ARMENI & FERREYRA DE BONE, supra note 334, at 32.
366. Id.; Telephone Interview with Lynn Roland & Esha Mufti (Oct. 31, 2019).
367. See Economy Builders, supra note 358.

368. Rewrite the Rules, supra note 307.
369. Id.
370. Everybody Is an Investor, BOS. UJIMA PROJECT, https://www.ujimaboston.com/
finance [https://perma.cc/D7E8-68KT].
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Alliance is failing to meet its requirement, which initiates an inquiry. 371 As a
result of the inquiry, the Ujima Business Alliance can remove the company
from the list.372 Unlike B Lab, whether a company has been removed from the
Ujima Business Alliance is readily available. 373
The Boston Ujima Project also has an investing arm called the Ujima
Fund. 374 Investments favor participatory processes and result from such

processes. The fund, launched in 2018, made its first investment in the form
of debt in a composting cooperative in Boston. 375 Before issuing the debt,

members of the Boston Ujima Project approved terms of the deal. 376 The

Ujima Fund uses community members to assess other future investments, and
community members consult with business owners on how they can best meet
the Ujima Project's standards.377
3.

Accountability to Beneficiaries

B Corps should be accountable to beneficiaries or beneficiaries'
representatives. Accountability provides incentive or coercion to ensure that
corporate constituents remain motivated to pursue the enterprise's stated goal.
Contractual mechanisms may grant intended beneficiaries the express right to
sue the company should it fail to satisfy some standard or engage in a
participatory process. B Corps may grant some nonshareholder stakeholder or
representative of a nonshareholder stakeholder the right to sue for injunctive
relief should the company fail in its pursuit of public benefit. Similar rights
may be granted to shareholders, as is provided for in the Delaware Public
Benefit Corporation legislation. 378
Courts are generally reluctant to grant nonshareholder stakeholders the
right to sue a company as a third-party beneficiary absent an explicit grant of

371. See Invest in Ujima, BOS. UJIMA PROJECT, https://www.ujimaboston.com/invest
[https://perma.cc/ME5Y-7F7B] (discussing how annual business reviews conducted by the
member-elected Community Standards Committee ensure businesses meet the project's Good
Business Standards).
372. Telephone Interview with Charles Wallace-Thomas IV (Jan. 7, 2020).
373. Id.
374. Everybody Is an Investor, supra note 370.
375. See, e.g., Oscar Perry Abello, The First DemocraticallyManaged Investment Fund

Launches in Boston, NEXT CITY (Dec. 28, 2018), https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/the-firstdemocratically-managed-investment-fund-launches-in-boston [https://perma.cc/BH7R-B94Z].
376. Everybody Is an Investor, supra note 370.

377. Id.
378. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 367 (West, Westlaw through ch. 292 of the 150th General
Assembly).
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the right to do so. 379 In impact investing deals, transaction documents may
grant beneficiaries certain enforcement rights should the transaction fail to
meet certain outcomes or include meaningful participation.380
IV. COMMON CRITICISMS OF BENEFICIARY PARTICIPATION

As mentioned in Section IILA, beneficiary participation is not without
critiques. This Section acknowledges some of these drawbacks and addresses
them in the specific B Corp context.
A.

Efficiency Concerns

Putting governance power in the hands of a B Corp's nonshareholder
beneficiaries may limit the efficiency of the corporate decision-making
process. Corporations, of course, are not perfectly efficient organizations to
begin with. 381 Some assume that shareholders have homogenous interests and
that granting shareholders the sole franchise among corporate constituents
avoids political breakdowns, voting pathologies, and difficulties in
apportioning voting power. 38 2 It has been shown that shareholders do not have

homogenous interests, however, so the likelihood that shareholders can or do
coalesce around a common goal is low. 383 As noted above, director duties may
help align interests between shareholders and corporate insiders, but they do
little to coordinate efforts and align interests among shareholders
themselves. 38 4 Democratic systems, including the corporation, exist to "take a

set of individual preference profiles and aggregate them into a group
choice . . . ."385

This same problem exists in a B Corp that has multiple beneficiaries or
purposes. Those beneficiaries will jockey for priority within the decisionmaking apparatus of the company. Even B Corps with a singular purpose

could see competition between beneficiaries and shareholders. Well-designed
participatory mechanisms should facilitate group choice among these
stakeholders. 38 6 B Corps have one advantage over traditional corporations in

379. See Tiffany M. Burba, To "B" or not to

'B": Duties of Directors and Rights of

Stakeholders in Benefit Corporations, 70 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 329, 345 (2017).
380. See id. at 338.
381. See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 138, at 2085.
382. Id.
383. Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, One Share, One Vote and the False Promise
ofShareholderHomogeneity, 30 CARDOzO L. REV. 445, 448-49 (2008).
384. See id. at 470.
385. Hayden & Bodie, supra note 138, at 2102.
386. See supra Section III.B for a discussion regarding principles.
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that they have leeway in how narrowly, or broadly, they define their public
purpose.38 7 A narrow and clearly defined set of beneficiaries should create a
more efficient decision-making process, and B Corp standards should favor
specifically defined public benefits and sets of beneficiaries.388
As many have pointed out, the input of additional parties to the decisionmaking structure of an enterprise slows down the decision-making process,
adding transaction costs and decreasing efficiency. 389 The reasons for not
granting additional power to shareholders, for example, are amplified in the
event that power is shared with outside stakeholder groups. European
governance structures that allow for worker representation on company
boards, discussed in Section II.D.2, have been criticized for resulting in
inefficient corporate governance when compared to American companies. 390
While some loss of efficiency may not be completely avoidable in the
Fourth Sector, 391that loss need not be fatal to a company's effectiveness and
should not deter B Corps from embracing the goal of beneficiary participation.
So-called impact investors are often willing to accept below market returns on
their investments in a B Corp or other purpose-driven company.3 92 They are

drawn to the mission of a company as much as to the potential for profit, and
some see that lower return as the internalization of negative externalities
produced by traditional corporations. 393 Further, as discussed in Section IILA,
this Article advocates for B Corp standards that encourage experimentation to
allow companies and beneficiaries to build structures that respond to the needs
of particular beneficiaries and situations while maintaining flexible,
responsive governance structures.

As applied to B Corps, one possible critique of beneficiary participation
derives from empirical evidence that increased shareholder power results in
better outcomes for employees, consumers, customers, and broader
communities.3 94 If shareholders are able to create positive outcomes for these
constituents, perhaps efficacy can be achieved without granting participatory

rights to others, particularly if shareholders are properly cultivated by the

387. Winston, supra note 40, at 1826.
388. See supra Part III for a discussion regarding the B Corp certification process.
389. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 159, at 1745-46.
390. Jackson, supra note 187, at 310-12.
391. See id. at 390.
392. MUDALIAR ET AL., supra note 89, at iii. Some investment funds have sought B Corp
certification themselves. See e.g., Certified B Corp, NAT. INVS. LLC, https://www.na
turalinvestments.com/about/certified-b-corp/ [https://perma.cc/A7TL-MG44] (describing what
a B Corp certification is and how it is obtained). Natural Investments LLC is a B Corp investment
fund that invests in what it considers to be sustainable portfolio companies. Id.
393. See Winston, supra note 40, at 1823.
394. Fairfax, supra note 126, at 96.
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enterprise.395 This would seem to endorse stewardship theory-corporate
systems as currently structured do indeed facilitate management decisionmaking in the interests of stakeholders, rendering the efficacy-based argument
in Section II.B moot. 396
It may be the case that, in their nascent stages, impact investors and other
shareholders in B Corps are especially attuned to the needs of nonshareholder
stakeholders and are willing to use their power as shareholders to hold
management accountable for their purpose-related actions. As the field grows,
however, capital will flow into these enterprises from a larger pool. There is
no guarantee this large pool will have either the same dedication or
sophistication as early-stage impact investors. As a result, future Fourth
Sector investors may be less willing or able to enforce public benefit. The
input of beneficiaries themselves is needed to counteract this.
This loss of efficiency, real or perceived, could also discourage
companies from opting into B Corp certification or into incorporation under

one of the new corporate forms. Details of governance are surely one factor
that drives entity choice for entrepreneurs, but external factors also play a
role. 397 As B Corps proliferate, they will continue to appeal to a customer base
that is interested in patronizing sustainable businesses, and B Corp
certification is a common and well-known signal that a company operates in
the interests of society and the environment. 398 The marketing advantage of

successfully applying for B Corp status could offset the burden of
participatory requirements, especially if B Lab and others are able to make the
case made in this Article-that beneficiary participation results in more
effective companies and programs. Further, it should not be assumed that the
success of a movement like the B Corp movement is measured by the number
of companies that seek the certification. 399 This success should be measured
by the viability of those B Corps that hold themselves accountable to
beneficiaries; to focus on numbers is to dilute this new idea of corporate
purpose.
B.

Beneficiary Capacityfor Participation

There are also concerns that beneficiary groups, particularly if composed
of marginalized populations, lack the capacity to engage in meaningful

395. See Belinfanti, supra note 267, at 817.
396. See id. at 865-66.
397. See Winston, supra note 40, at 1796.
398. See Tu, supra note 70, at 152.
399. See Winston, supra note 40, at 1836 (explaining how B Corps report on their public
benefit goals and the extent to which they have reached those goals).
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that an already burdened or marginalized

population (or even organization) add strategic decision-making within a forprofit enterprise to its responsibilities can seem daunting.401 Similar concerns
were voiced about maximum feasible participation during and since the War
on Poverty. 40 2 Careful consideration is required before burdening these
groups, and resources (i.e., time and money) may be required to build
participatory capacity. 403 Scholars of New Governance also argue that
participatory mechanisms can themselves result in robust participation and

enhanced capacity. 404 Participatory structures that comply with the principles
set forth in this Article can create a virtuous cycle in which Fourth Sector
enterprises truly feel stakeholder communities' interests and who, in turn, find
themselves better able to direct corporate activity. For investors and
entrepreneurs serious about social and environmental sustainability, this is a
worthwhile investment. While this kind of mobilization is expensive, impact
investors who expect lower returns over a longer time are well-positioned to
provide the initial capital required to organize and train beneficiaries. 405
Similar concerns have been raised in the context of Democratic
Experimentalism-structures that empower diverse stakeholders to
participate in their governance will necessarily replicate and even exacerbate
preexisting power imbalances and inequality. 406 Here again, B Lab has an
important role to play in safeguarding marginalized groups through mandating

that permissible corporate purposes remain flexible and that participation
continues throughout the life of the company, while also emphasizing the
threat of meaningful sanctions for companies that fail to engage in this
process, like public reprimand or removal of a company's B Corp status.
Democratic Experimentalism tries to account for the possibility of
uncooperative behavior, like disputes between a company's workforce and
some other stakeholder, with thoughtful design, punitive actions when actors
do not take into account stakeholders' interests, and a limit on the universe of
possible outcomes. 407 "The combination of ambitious, open-ended goals,

400. See Bach, supra note 270, at 261.
401. See William H. Simon, New GovernanceAnxieties: A Deweyan Response, 2010 WIS.
L. REV. 727, 734.
402. See Bach, supra note 45, at 103-06.
403. See, e.g., id.
404. See id. at 156.
405. See Winston, supra note 40, at 1823 (describing the long-term perspective of impact
investors).
406. Sabel & Simon, supra note 277, at 24.
407. Id. at 51 ("People sometimes worry that experimentalism is insensitive to distributive
issues and that the move to experimentalist regimes will exacerbate the situation of
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planning obligations and threat of potentially draconian penalties for
obstinately uncooperative behavior encourage investigation of new
possibilities, including contextualized variants of general solutions, and
collaboration among regulated parties and between them as a group and the
regulator." 408
C.

Cosmetic Participation

Finally, new governance apparatuses risk resulting in participation that is

cosmetic rather than altering the underlying power structure of a program or
enterprise. 409 A program that employs cosmetic participation will appear to

the outside to reflect beneficiaries' input; however, beneath the veneer of
participation, a program's activities reflect the goals and desires of other, more
powerful stakeholders. B Lab could give the imprimatur of B Corp status to a
company because the enterprises adopt a pro forma participatory measure

without empowering the interests of intended beneficiaries ahead (or at least
alongside) those of management and capital.
This risk is particularly acute when beneficiaries are poor or otherwise
marginalized. 410 As discussed in Section IV.B, these stakeholder groups
require investment to build the capacity to engage in meaningful
participation. 411 Absent this investment, the harms of a lack of participation
will be amplified. The impression that marginalized groups' participation is
meaningful will further silence them. 412

In addition to building capacity among marginalized beneficiary groups,
successful New Governance programs compel participants to seek consensus

or to at least strive toward consensus to combat the risk of cosmetic
participation. 413 Both corporate law and practice recognize there are situations

in an enterprise's life that require a higher level of consent than majority

disadvantaged stakeholders. They are, of course, clearly right to emphasize that the outcome of
a collaborative process will be affected by the relative resources of the participants. Even if a
group's consent is required to go forward, that consent may be inflected by the group's
disadvantage. Experimentalist regime design does try to take account of these factors in three
ways.... First, procedural design can try to mitigate inequality.... Second, if design can reach
background default rules, than [sic] it can enhance equality by shaping the rule that will govern
in the absence of stakeholder agreement. . . . Third, certain possible outcomes can be ruled out
as substantively unacceptable.").
408. Dani Rodrik & Charles F. Sabel, Building a Good Jobs Economy (Nov. 2019)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the South CarolinaLaw Review).
409. Lee, supra note 268, at 414.
410. Id. at 406, 414.
411. See supra Section IV.B.
412. See Lee, supra note 268, at 406, 415.
413. See id. at 418.
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approval. 41 4 As applied to corporate governance, for instance, beneficiaries or
their representatives could be given veto power over significant transactions.
Requiring absolute consensus is difficult, but super-majoritarian requirements

and veto rights that force a B Corp to not only consult but also follow the
wishes of beneficiaries in certain circumstances can serve as a powerful
counter against cosmetic participation.
V. CONCLUSION

The democratic ideal rests on the idea that a person for whose benefit a
system operates should have some input into how that system is run.4 15 A
novel application of this principle to B Corp certification and related
developments in corporate law provides an opportunity to build a
participatory economy. The B Corp movement represents an opportunity to

create an economic model grounded in the fundamentals that underlie both
American corporate law and anti-poverty and economic development
program design. A more participatory B Corp certification can result in
companies that are more responsive to specifically designated corporate

beneficiaries' interests. Doing so requires that B Corps and related companies
involve beneficiaries at the enterprise's design, implementation, and
evaluation stages. To do so necessarily risks adding administrative
complexity, lowering efficiency, and placing additional weights on already
burdened communities. New Governance theory provides helpful guidance in
this area, encouraging flexible corporate governance mechanisms and
allowing for enterprise designs that adapt to the needs and capabilities of
beneficiary groups.

414. See id.
415. Philippe C. Schmitter & Terry Lynn Karl, What Democracy Is . . and Is Not, 2 J.
DEMOCRACY 75, 76 (1991) ("Modern political democracy is a system of governance in which
rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly
through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives.").
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